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Over the past decade, docket pressures on the federal judiciary have prompt-
ed dramatic revisions in federal procedure. These revisions have sharply in-
creased the administrative power of the federal courts to determine which
claims are sufficiently meritorious to be brought to trial. The 1983 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure granted broad managerial control to the
federal judiciary to direct that all cases be subject to negotiation under the aegis
of the courts and that wayward counsel be subject to court-imposed sanctions.1
Thus armed, the courts were sent off to battle against the docket pressures of
a society seemingly bent on litigation for all manner of perceived ills.2
In 1986, the Supreme Court added another weapon to the arsenal designed
to check the spread of litigation. In a trilogy of cases addressing the standards
for presenting a claim to the ultimate trier of fact-Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,3
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,4 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp. v. Zenith
Radio---the Court significantly expanded the applicability of summary judg-
ment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which denies
litigants access to trial when the court determines that there is "no genuine issue
as to any material fact" such as to preclude "judgment as a matter of law."
These cases brought into the battle against excess litigation a weapon held
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1. A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBIY 2 (1983 amendments "represent
an integrated package" granting greater managerial discretion to federal courts).
2. See Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3,15 n.44 (1986) (assembling
statistics on litigation growth). Although Professor Galanter disputes the conclusion of America as a
litigiously-oriented society, his figures nonetheless reveal that the total number of cases filed in federal courts
more than doubled between 1975 and 1984. Id. See also Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, Annual Report
on the State of the Judiciary 68 A.B.A. L 274 (1982); Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from
the Institute for Civil Justice Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.. 479 (1987); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORMl 76-77 and App. B, Table B.2 (1985) (showing approximately 400% increase in federal
civil filings from 1963 to 1983); Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 6-12 (reporting judges' perceptions of caseload effects).
3. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
5. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
The Yale Law Journal
largely in reserve by the federal courts since the promulgation of the Federal
Rules in 1938.
The summary judgment trilogy seems consistent with the spirit of the 1983
revisions to the Federal Rules in encouraging the judiciary to screen as well
as adjudicate cases.6 Summary judgment provides a mechanism for the courts
to review cases prior to trial once the parties have concluded the discovery
necessary to establish the existence of material issues in dispute.7 Indeed, the
current proposed revisions to the Federal Rules would create a category of
"summary establishment of fact and law" under which the courts would have
increased authority to decide which factual issues merit adjudication at trial.'
The expansion of summary judgment is designed to control both the volume
of litigation overall and its scope in any particular case.9 However, as we argue
below, the impact of altering summary judgment rules goes beyond this hoped-
for screening function. Alterations of summary judgment procedures have
consequences for the information balance between, and incentives operating on,
both parties, and these in turn affect the entire spectrum of decisions facing
litigants, from the filing of lawsuits to the choice between settling and litigating
the claim through to trial. To some extent, moreover, the expansion of summary
judgment is subject to the normative critiques directed against bringing institu-
tional pressures to bear to force non-adjudicated resolution of disputes.10 This
Article, however, takes as its point of departure the articulated premises of the
expansion of summary judgment, primarily its claimed role in reducing litiga-
tion. Having assumed the propriety of these premises, this Article critically
examines the extent to which the desired effects are likely to be realized, and
at what cost.
An economic analysis of the impact of the relaxed summary judgment rules
reveals the extent to which summary judgment actually limits litigation and the
extent to which its additional unintended consequences may compromise its
effectiveness as a tool to relieve docket pressure on the federal courts. This
6. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 789,795 (1989) (tying in altered Rule 56 with the 1983 amendments to Rules 7, 11, and 16).
7. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(f) (providing for deferral of consideration of summary judgment motion until
discovery is complete).
8. For an extensive discussion of the proposed modifications of Rule 56, see Carrington, Making Rules
to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2094-05 (1989).
9. See Advisory Committee Notes, Proposed Rules at 170 (this "device is especially encouraged in
complex cases in which issues of fact may metastasize if the court does not take action to confine the
dispute and proscribe costly overextension of discovery and trial").
10. The leading exponent of this view is Professor Owen Fiss who sees the prospect of peace between
the parties achieved outside of full adjudication as risking the public loss of the explication and articulation
of legal and constitutional rights. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.L 1073, 1085 (1984). See also
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668, 677-78 (1986)
("mere resolution of a dispute is not proof that the public interest has been served"); Higginbotham, The




analysis demonstrates that summary judgment is an effective screening measure
insofar as it intercepts cases that are of marginal value to the plaintiff or those
that are simply non-meritorious or frivolous. However, this desired effect is
counterbalanced by two potential unanticipated consequences.
First, the eased standards for bringing summary judgment motions may have
adverse consequences for the ability of the parties to settle cases where summa-
ry judgment motions have been made and denied. Given that the vast majority
of cases in the federal courts settle well prior to any litigated outcome, any
compromise of the settlement rate could have a negative systemic effect on
federal litigation overall. Such an adverse impact would be contrary to the
conventional wisdom that summary judgment should promote fair settlements
by forcing an evidentiary confrontation prior to trial."
Second, summary judgment fundamentally alters the balance of power
between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the costs and risks to plain-
tiffs in the pretrial phases of litigation while diminishing both for defendants.
Even where summary judgment motions are not filed, the potential use of
liberalized summary judgment procedures is sufficient to lower the expected
value to plaintiffs of settled claims. Therefore, liberalized summary judgment
inhibits the filing of otherwise meritorious suits and results in a wealth transfer
from plaintiffs as a class to defendants as a class.
This article will analyze the consequences of the summary judgment trilogy
from several perspectives. In the following section, we undertake a doctrinal
review of the origins and purposes of the summary judgment trilogy to assess
the legal underpinnings of the altered standards under Rule 56. Section II
presents an economic analysis of the consequences of summary judgment on
settlement rates, efficiency, and the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants in light of its impact on the timing and magnitude of costs incurred
by the parties. Section III further extends this analysis by considering the
impact of extrinsic factors that may further complicate the new summary
judgment balance, such as the role of repeat litigants and the strategic use of
information obtained in summary judgment. In Section IV we examine various
procedural alterations that could mitigate the problems identified with the post-
trilogy summary judgment standard; we evaluate the predicted impact of
modifications such as precluding defendants from introducing evidence that was
available but not introduced at the time of the summary judgment motion, and
fee shifting, where the defeat of a summary judgment motion will trigger the
payment of fees and costs incurred by the nonmovant in defending against the
summary judgment motion.
11. This evidentiary confrontation is thought to promote settlements by forcing both parties to tackle
the scope of the factual record and to balance the realistic probabilities of success against the costs
associated with further litigation. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973).
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I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE TRILOGY
Summary judgment is a relative newcomer to the Anglo-American legal
scene. The origins of summary judgment can be traced to the Bills of Exchange
Act of 1855 in England 2 which developed a rudimentary procedure for sum-
mary judgment in a narrow category of contract cases involving liquidated
claims met with only spurious defenses. 3 Summary judgment was a mecha-
nism to combat the "law's delay" 4 by allowing courts to strike "any frivolous
or sham defense to the whole or to any part of the complaint."15 It provided
plaintiffs with a motion somewhat akin to a post-pleading default judgment.
As expressed by the Supreme Court, the purpose of summary judgment was
"to preserve the court from frivolous defences and to defeat attempts to use
formal pleading as means to delay the recovery of just demands."' 6
Although an increasing number of state courts used variants of summary
judgment by the early part of this century," it remained an exceptional prac-
tice. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the
Supreme Court had only once confronted the constitutional issues raised by
summary judgment and had upheld the narrow use of the procedure to reject
frivolous defenses.' 8 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, first promulgated
in 1938, extended the applicability of this device to all cases, including those
arising in equity, and to all parties. 19 The Federal Rules made summary judg-
ment available, at least in principle, as a broad-scale tool for the entry of a final
decree on the merits of all claims before the federal courts. This expansion
12. The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 (1855). See also
Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 745 (1974); Clark &
Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.. 423, 424 (1929).
13. See generally 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2711
(2d ed. 1983).
14. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 12, at 423.
15. An Act to Regulate the Practice of Courts of Law, ch. 231, 1912 NJ. Laws 377,380; 2 NJ. Comp.
Stat. (Supp. 1915) §§ 15, 16.
16. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902). The Court in Fidelity relied
heavily on the unreported opinion of the Court in Smoot v. Rittenhouse (Jan. 10, 1876), which upheld the
use of summary judgment in liquidated contract claims as against a constitutional challenge that it denied
defendant the right to trial by jury.
17. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 12, at 440-470 (giving state by state descriptions of summary
judgment procedures); Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J 193
(1928) (review of summary judgment in three Southern states).
18. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. at 320. In addition, the Supreme Court had
affirmed the use of summary judgment against sureties on appeal bonds and on appeal bonds themselves.
Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng'g Co., 243 U.S. 273, 279 (1917); see also id. at 278 nn.1 & 2 (listing cases).
19. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 13, § 2711. The Federal Rules Committee relied
upon the 1933 extension of summary judgment in New York State procedure to allow for judgment for
defendants as well as plaintiffs. Report of the Commission on Administration of Justice in New York State
287 (1934). The New York State Commission encouraged the broad use of summary judgment for all causes
of action, as well as all parties. Id.
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represented a significant alteration of American jurisprudence, which had
guaranteed access to trial by jury as a right of constitutional magnitude."
From its inception, federal judges treated summary judgment warily,
perceiving it as threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the right
to confront witnesses, the right of the jury to make inferences and determina-
tions of credibility, and the right to have one's cause advocated by counsel
before a jury.21 For example, in 1962 the Supreme Court discouraged the use
of summary judgment in antitrust litigation, stating "[t]rial by affidavit is no
substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of 'even handed
justice.' " Even the reporter for the original Federal Rules Committee, Judge
Charles Clark, was unable to implement the broad use of summary judgment
in his home forum, the Second Circuit. 3 Until the Supreme Court decided the
1986 summary judgment trilogy, the Second Circuit required denial of summary
judgment whenever the "slightest doubt" existed as to whether the nonmovant
might persuade a jury of the merits of her case.' The "slightest doubt" stan-
dard earned the Second Circuit a widespread reputation for hostility to summary
judgment motions.'
Summary judgment fared little better in other courts. In the Third Circuit,
to take another example, summary judgment was denied as a matter of law
when the motion was contrary to averments that were "well-pleaded," that is,
not even a factual matter of record.26 Although the 1963 Amendment to Rule
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIL The strongest articulation of this view occurs in Justice Black's concur-
rence in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970): "[Plaintiff Adickes] may have had to prove
her case by impeaching the [defendant's] witnesses .... The right to confront, cross-examine and impeach
adverse witnesses is one of the most fundamental rights sought to be preserved by the Seventh Amendment
. ." Justice Black's reasoning was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464
(1962), where the Court indicated that the preservation of the right to confront witnesses was of critical
importance in cases where liability turns on motive or intent. Id. at 472-73. But see First Nat'l Bank of
Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298-99 (1968) (holding that courts do not exist to provide
opportunity for litigation gambles to pay off). See generally Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has
There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 771-75 (1988).
21. See, e.g., Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949) (opinion of Judge Jerome Frank, a
leading opponent of summary judgment); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (same);
cf. Comment, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme
Court, 37 EMORY L.J. 171, 173-80 (1988) (describing debate in Second Circuit between Judge Frank and
Judge Charles Clark, the reporter for the Federal Rules Committee).
22. Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. at 473.
23. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of subverting purposes
of adoption of federal rules by refusing to permit broad use of summary judgment).
24. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825,830 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Louis, Federal Summary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745, 760-62 (1974) (discussing Second Circuit
summary judgment standard).
25. See Knight v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. (1987)
(acknowledging prior "perception that this court is unsympathetic to such motions and frequently reverses
grants of summary judgment").
26. See, e.g., Frederick Hart & Co., Inc. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948). The Third
Circuit view was rejected by a 1963 Amendment to the Federal Rules in the only substantive change to
Rule 56 since its promulgation. In the words of the Advisory Committee Notes, "[i]t is hoped that the
amendment will contribute to the more effective utilization of the salutary device of summary judgment."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes, 1963 Amendment.
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56 expressly rejected the Third Circuit view,27 Justices Black and Douglas
endorsed that view, criticizing the amendment for transforming summary judg-
ment into "a handy instrument to let judges rather than juries try laws [sic] suits
and to let those judges try cases not on evidence of witnesses subjected to
cross-examination but on ex parte affidavits obtained by parties."'  The oft-
recounted tale of the sign posted in a New Orleans district court, "No Spitting,
No Summary Judgments,"29 encapsulates the extreme version of judicial antip-
athy to summary judgment. Trial courts, faced with uncertain standards for
summary judgment and extraordinary reversal rates in cases where judgment
was granted, denied the motion whenever any doubt was present. 0 Increasing-
ly, summary judgment became a litigation tool of the well-heeled litigant who
saw in Rule 56 potential strategic value "as a discovery device; to educate the
trial judge; in the hope, however faint, of quick victory; and in the expectation,
frequently realized, of retarding the progress of a suit and making litigation
more expensive."'3'
Not surprisingly, summary judgment began to attract renewed interest from
commentators as the press of litigation continued to mount on the federal
judiciary.32 Particularly in light of the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes, 1963 Amendment.
28. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. B (Orders of the Supreme
Court of United States Regarding Civil Rules) (statement of Justices Black and Douglas opposing submission
of Rules of Civil Procedure because they do not satisfy legislative requirements of bicameralism and
presentment) (1973). Justices Black and Douglas added, "[m]ost trial lawyers would agree, we think, that
a litigant can frequently obtain in an actual trial favorable testimony which could not have been secured
by affidavits or even by depositions." Id.
29. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 REV. OF
LmG. 263, 264 (1987); see also Croxen v. United States Chemical Corp., 558 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Iowa
1982) (summary judgment "an extreme and treacherous remedy"). The doctrinal formulation of these
aphorisms is that "summary judgment should be used sparingly in all cases, and it is only with great caution
and much soul-searching that such motions will be granted." Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 543
F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (.D. La. 1982), affTd 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
30. Louis, supra note 12, at 746. One study of disposition of summary judgment rulings on appeal
found that only 51.4 percent of 215 appealed decisions were affirmed. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study
of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 . LEGAL STUD. 427, 449 (1977). See generally Note, Federal
Summary Judgment: The "New" Workhorse for an Overburdened Federal Court System, 20 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 955, 956 n.6 (1987) (citing authorities on reversal rates and perceptions of summary judgment as
disfavored procedure).
31. Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatkis, 799 F.2d 218,221-22 (5th Cir. 1986).
32. The leading academic advocate of relaxing the standards for granting summary judgment has been
Professor Martin Louis. See Louis, supra note 12. Professor Louis advocates recasting the burden of
production on the moving party to reflect the ultimate burden that the movant would bear at trial. Under
his standard, a defendant-movant would still bear a substantial burden of going forward, although not as
heavy as that of a plaintiff-movant-a position apparently similar to the views of Justice White in Celotex.
See Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtffd Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading,
Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1023 (1989). Other commentators endorsing a modification of the burden of production on a summary
judgment movant to reflect that party's ultimate burden at trial include Bogart, Currie and Pielemeier. See
Bogart, Summary Judgment. A Comparative and Critical Analysis, 19 OSGOODE HALL L.L 552, 594-95
(1981); Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 72, 78 (1977);
Pielemeier, Summary Judgment in Minnesota: A Search for Patterns, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 147, 158
(1981). Professor Currie further advocates removing virtually all barriers to the motion for summary
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granting the district courts unprecedented powers in the management of cases,
the restrictive view of summary judgment seemed decisively out of step with
the attempt to streamline the civil dockets by modifying civil procedure. In
addition, the expansion of summary judgment corresponded to the infusion of
economic analyses of incentive structures in civil procedure. Since, according
to this view, obstacles to settlement grow primarily out of imperfect information
about the relative merits of each side's case,33 and since summary judgment
provides for a final round of pretrial exchange of information, an expansion of
summary judgment should presumably facilitate settlement.
The summary judgment trilogy fundamentally altered Rule 56 in two ways.
First, these cases eased the initial burden placed on the party moving for
summary judgment by permitting a summary judgment movant to prevail
without having to establish fully the nonexistence of material facts in dispute.
Second, the Court allowed greater district court latitude in determining the
existence of issues meriting trial, thereby easing the grant of summary judg-
ment. Together, these cases give increased prominence to summary judgment
in modern litigation.
A. Recasting the Movant's Burden
Under Rule 56(e), a motion for summary judgment is to be "made and sup-
ported as provided in this rule. '34 Case law prior to Celotex treated this am-
biguously worded requirement in the same terms as would apply to a movant
generally, that is, as a requirement that the movant carry the burden of proof
on the subject of the motion." The leading case prior to Celotex was Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co.,36 which involved a conspiracy claim arising out of the
refusal of luncheonette service to, and subsequent arrest of, a white civil-rights
worker in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The conspiracy claim was premised on an
allegation of concerted activity between a private actor (S.H. Kress) and state
actors (the police who ultimately arrested Ms. Adickes for vagrancy). The
record contained allegations that the arresting policeman had been in the store
when service was refused, but there was no evidence presented by the plaintiff
as to any conspiratorial activity other than the policeman's possible presence.
Defendant then sought summary judgment on the grounds that "uncontested
judgment made by parties not bearing the ultimate burden of proof at trial. He recommends that the movant
be required to bear only a limited burden of production, so that the nonmovant will be held to proving the
issues of fact that remain in dispute.
33. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 525-26 (3d. ed. 1986); Posner, supra note 11, at
423. For a fuller discussion of the merits of this view of summary judgment, see infra text accompanying
notes 143-51.
34. FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(e).
35. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 514 (5th Cir. 1982); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 36 (10th Cir. 1975); see also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 99, at 668 n.29 (4th ed. 1983).
36. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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facts," including the unrebutted affidavits of the store manager and several
police officers, pointed against a conspiracy and that plaintiff had failed to
introduce substantive evidence to support the existence of the conspiracy. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument: "[T]he moving party . . . ha[s] the
burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and
for these purposes the material it lodged must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the opposing party."3 7 The motion for summary judgment failed,
the Supreme Court held, because the affidavits of record did not foreclose a
possible inference of a conspiracy by the jury from the fact that the policeman
was present at the time that service was refused. Since such an inference could
not be foreclosed from the "factual allegations of [Adickes'] complaint, as well
as the material found in the affidavits and depositions presented by Kress ....
[Kress] failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
of fact."3"
The Court in Adickes did not address what evidence, short of Kress's
satisfying its complete burden of proof of negating the existence of issues in
dispute, might suffice to shift the burden of production to the plaintiff to
establish the viability of her case. Nonetheless, Adickes was widely interpreted
to require a movant for summary judgment to "foreclose the possibility" that
the nonmovant might prevail at trial.39
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of the movant's burden under
summary judgment in Celotex. Because the claim in Celotex turned on the
alleged exposure of the plaintiff's deceased husband to asbestos products
produced by Celotex Corporation, a strict application of Adickes would for all
practical purposes defeat any prospect of summary judgment. Under such an
application, the defendant would have to prove nonexposure at any point in the
decedent's life in order to foreclose the possibility of a plaintiff's verdict at
trial.
While nodding to the continued viability of Adickes, the Supreme Court in
Celotex recast the burden to be shouldered by a party moving for summary
judgment. Under Celotex a movant's burden of production-the quantum of
evidence needed from which an inference in favor of the movant might be
drawn-comports with the ultimate burden of proof the movant would have
at trial. As a result, Celotex still conformed to the normal requirement that a
movant bear the ultimate burden for her motion. But Celotex also refocused the
37. Id. at 157.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982) (affirming reversal of summary judgment on
grounds that defendant-movants had not foreclosed possibility that removal of books from school library
was unconstitutionally motivated); Smith v. Hudson, 600 E2d 60, 64 (6th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 444 U.S.
986 (1979) (relying on Adickes to establish that "burden of establishing the nonexistence of a material factual
dispute always rests with the movanf'); Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973)
(same); see also Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40
HAsTINGS LJ. 53, 63-64 & n.56 (1988).
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critical inquiry to the question of the burden of production that a movant must
satisfy to shift that intermediate burden to the nonmovant to establish her right
to go to trial. Instead of a uniform burden imposed upon the movant, the Court
decreed that the movant's burden of production for summary judgment would
depend on the movant's ultimate burden of proof at trial.4°
Thus, while the issue of how the movant's burden of production is to be
satisfied is not conclusively resolved, each of the three summary judgment
opinions in Celotex4' represents a retreat from the Adickes standard for sum-
mary judgment with regard to the burden of production that would be required
of a movant for summary judgment. Under Adickes, the movant bears the
burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment and bears the full burden
of production, regardless of the ultimate burden that party would bear at trial.42
The varying Celotex standards assume the movant to bears the burden of proof
for the motion, but diverge as to the burden of production required to force the
plaintiff nonmovant to prove the existence of facts in dispute. For the Rehnquist
plurality the burden would be that of simply "informing" the court of the
absence of facts in dispute.4 3 For Justice White, who provides the crucial fifth
vote, a mere "conclusory assertion" that no evidence supports plaintiff is
insufficient to discharge the movant's burden of production 4 Justice Brennan,
in dissent, offers the movant without the burden of proof at trial two options
to satisfy its burden of production: either (1) introduce affirmative evidence
negating an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, or (2) affirmatively
demonstrate that there is no evidence in the pleadings, documents or affidavits
in the record to support plaintiff's claim 5
After Celotex, the movant who does not carry the ultimate burden at
trial-i.e., a defendant moving for summary judgment46-- would bear a far
lesser initial burden than previously, now defined by the plurality opinion as
"the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion . . . ."47 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "the burden on the
moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the
40. 477 U.S. at 324.
41. The three opinions are by Justices Rehnquist, White and Brennan. Justice Rehnquist authored the
lead opinion for himself and Justices Marshall, Powell and O'Connor. 477 U.S. at 319. Justice White
concurred to provide the necessary fifth vote. Id. at 328. Justice Brennan authored a dissent for himself,
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 329. Justice Stevens dissented on an unrelated
jurisdictional issue. Id. at 337.
42. See, e.g., 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.15[3] (2d. ed. 1988) (supporting this as traditional
view).
43. 477 U.S. at 323.
44. 477 U.S. at 328.
45. 477 U.S. at 331-32.
46. A possible exception to this characterization may be made for plaintiffs seeking summaryjudgment
on affirmative defenses or counterclaims. This article considers such use of summary judgment as anoma-
lous. Facilitating summary judgment on counterclaims, for example, would do little to relieve the strain on
the judiciary since this would leave the main action intact.
47. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case."4 8 Under this standard, a defendant moving for summary judg-
ment stands in the same procedural posture as a movant for a directed verdict
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).4 9
The motion need not be accompanied by affidavits or documentary evidence
and may rely solely on pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, and
admissions on file. 0 Indeed, as revealed by the facts of Celotex, a moving
party may prevail at summary judgment having "made no effort to adduce any
evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its motion."'" At
bottom, therefore, the significance of Celotex lies in the Court's relieving
defendants, in their customary posture as the party moving for summary
judgment,52 of any significant burden of production to establish affirmatively
the absence of material issues of fact in dispute. 3
Similarly, Celotex recasts the burden of production once shifted to nonmov-
ants to correspond to their ultimate trial burden.
48. Id. at 325. The application of this standard remains somewhat in doubt due to the peculiarity of
the division of the Court in Celotex. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Justices White, Marshall, Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice White's critical fifth vote is tempered,
however, by a separate concurrence which disagrees with several of the central premises of the Rehnquist
opinion. Thus, White states, in apparent rejection of the majority holding, "[i]t is not enough to move for
summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff
has no evidence to prove his case .... It is the defendant's task [as movant] to negate, if he can, the
claimed basis for the suit." 477 U.S. at 328. Justice White, who urges remand for consideration of the
plaintiff's response to summary judgment, appears even to disagree with the Court's holding, which reverses
and remands. Nonetheless, the lower courts have treated the plurality view of summary judgment as
controlling. See infra Section LD. for assessment of district court burdens on defendant-movants.
49. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). There are
significant differences between the summary judgment and the motion for a directed verdict contexts, the
import of which will be developed in the economic analysis in Section II of this article. First, in the motion
for directed verdict context, there is no asymmetry in expenditures between the parties because both parties
have incurred full pretrial trial expenses and a commensurate share of trial expenses at the point when the
motion for a directed verdict is made. Thus, there is no wealth transfer from plaintiff to defendant such as
that which results from the asymmetry in expenses at the time of a summary judgment motion., Second,
the directed verdict has no appreciable consequences for aggregate expenditures, whereas summary judgment
increases the variance of aggregate expenditures. If the summary judgment motion succeeds, the defendant
will bear minimal costs and aggregate expenditures will be lower. If the motion fails, however, aggregate
expenditures will be increased to the extent that plaintiff's expenditures are not recoverable at trial. Third,
unlike the summary judgment context, defendants moving for a directed verdict have no incentive for
strategic misuse of a directed verdict motion, for example, to obtain trial preparation information from the
plaintiff. Moreover, "the post-trial determination is made on the basis of a compiled record, not an apparent
record that is yet to be made and can therefore be appraised only with somewhat greater caution." Carring-
ton, supra note 8, at 2097-98. For a comparison of practice under Rules 56 and 50, see Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudica-
tion Process, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 95, 144-59 (1988).
50. 477 U.S. at 324.
51. Id. at 321, quoting Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(emphasis in original).
52. See Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110 FR.D. 213,216 (1986)
(motion for summary judgment by party having ultimate burden of proof at trial is "relatively rare case").
53. The Celotex opinions leave untouched the question of the proper burden of production to be borne
by a movant who would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial-i.e., a plaintiff moving for summary
judgment. Presumably, the movant under such circumstances would still be held to the Adickes standard.
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Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. 4
Thus, Celotex alters the requirements of summary judgment for both the movant
and nonmovant to correspond to each party's ultimate burdens at trial. This
alteration completes the shift from summary judgment as a plaintiff's motion
prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules to a defendant's motion under
Celotex. By streamlining the production required of a movant without the
ultimate burden of proof, Celotex facilitates recourse to summary judgment by
defendants. Similarly, by then placing the burden of production upon the
nonmovant to come forward with evidence of the full range of facts in dispute,
the Court enhanced the incentives for defendants seeking to avail themselves
of this procedural device.55
The Celotex Court's direction on remand that evidentiary issues be consid-
ered as part of the summary judgment inquiry, confirms the prodefendant
departure from Adickes. The summary judgment standard developed through
Adickes would allow a plaintiff-nonmovant to escape summary judgment so
long as defendant-movant had not conclusively foreclosed the possibility that
she might persuade a jury of her claim, even if only inferentially. In Celotex,
by contrast, the Court acknowledged that the record contained documents
submitted by plaintiff supporting her position on material issues in the case,
yet nonetheless remanded the case for careful examination of the admissibility
of these documents.5 6
54. 477 U.S. at 322; see also id. at 324 n.5 (citing articles by Louis and Currie urging that summary
judgment be recast to reflect the ultimate trial burdens).
55. The threshold showing from defendants may indeed prove to be extraordinarily limited:
Something close to a one page form motion by defendant can throw on the plaintiff the responsibility
to dredge, structure, collate and cross-reference all materials in the file to make them available to the
judge before trial. Because the material must be reduced to a coherently structured written form, this
task can sometimes take as long or longer than actually trying the case.
Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New
Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35, 41 (1988).
56. The Court's dicta on this issue are particularly puzzling. As Rehnquist acknowledges, the record
contained sworn deposition testimony supporting plaintiff's claim, a letter from a potential witness asserting
plaintiff's version of the critical facts at issue, and a third letter of support for the main proposition in the
case. 477 U.S. at 320. Since defendant did not support its motion with any affidavits, this evidence remained
uncontroverted. The Court determined that the evidence was insufficient to defeat the summary judgment
motion absent a finding that this evidence would be admissible at trial. See also 477 U.S. at 320-22. There
is nothing in the language of Rule 56(c), which speaks only of the presence or absence of genuine issues
as to any material fact, that would indicate that plaintiff's evidence must satisfy a hearsay standard. See
Nelken, supra note 39, at 72-77 (criticizing Court's treatment of admissibility of evidence issue). On remand,
the D.C. Circuit determined that plaintiff's evidence would have been admissible over hearsay objections
and, consequently, again denied summary judgment. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33,
37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988).
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By directing lower courts to inquire into evidentiary sufficiency at the
summary judgment stage, the Supreme Court opened the door to pretrial
adjudication on the merits, regardless of whether the district judge would be
constitutionally empowered to sit as the ultimate trier of fact. Thus, even
documents that raise genuine issues of material fact may be insufficient for the
purpose of withstanding a summary judgment motion if they do not meet the
standards of admissibility that would prevail at trial. As confirmed by Anderson,
"in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evi-
dence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden."5 7
It is hard to imagine that the record in Adickes, which contained no evidence
at all on the issue of conspiracy or scienter, would have withstood any eviden-
tiary scrutiny.58
Primarily, Celotex reordered the burdens facing each party at the summary
judgment stage to mirror the ultimate burdens that each party would bear at
trial, thereby greatly reducing the demands made upon defendant-movants. The
introduction of evidentiary requirements reflecting those at trial, however, takes
summary judgment one step beyond simply easing the burden on movants. Read
in conjunction with Anderson and Matsushita, Celotex doctrinally approves a
new era of summary adjudication. 9
B. Evidentiary Review Under Summary Judgment
The new, post-Celotex direction of summary judgment is reinforced by the
accompanying cases of the trilogy, Anderson and Matsushita. Whereas Celotex
facilitates the process of bringing a summary judgment motion before the court,
Anderson and Matsushita increase the chances that a trial court will grant
summary judgment. These cases move decisively beyond the position that the
district court, passing on a motion for summary judgment, acts primarily as a
guarantor that some issues of material fact will be in dispute prior to submis-
sion of the case to the trier of fact. Rather, they expand the discretionary
authority given to the district courts by allowing broad pretrial evidentiary
review.
This is most clearly evident in Anderson, a defamation action involving
columnist Jack Anderson which raised the issue of portrayal of public figures
in the institutional press. Anderson presented the Court with a chance to define
57. 477 U.S. at 254.
58. Justice Brennan's dissent in Anderson convincingly argues that had the court examined evidentiary
sufficiency in Adickes, "we clearly would have had to affirm, rather than reverse, the lower courts, since
in that case there was no admissible evidence submitted by petitioner, and a significant amount of evidence
presented by the defendant tending to rebut the existence of a conspiracy." 477 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In fact, the sum of the nonmovant's case was "an unrebutted assertion that a Kress employee
and a policeman were in the same room at the time of the alleged constitutional violation." Id. at 263-64.




the role of the district court in summary judgment in the context of the tension
between common law defamation and the constitutional protections afforded
the investigative media. Since New York Times v. Sullivan," the Supreme
Court has repeatedly expressed its concern for the chilling effect of such
defamation actions on fundamental First Amendment freedoms.61 Nevertheless,
the Court has repeatedly asserted its refusal "to grant special procedural
protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the
constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws."'62 Thus, the Court
in Anderson confronted the combination of a constitutionally disfavored cause
of action and concern for the chilling effect of the litigation itself without any
procedural shortcut for avoiding trial. This made Anderson a ripe case for the
Court to extend the availability of summary judgment.
Whereas Celotex directed the courts below only to inquire into the eviden-
tiary sufficiency of the record, Anderson recast summary judgment into the
mold of a motion for a directed verdict.' Thus, "[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient
.... The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to
a verdict."' Judges examining the record on a motion for summary judgment
are directed to determine whether the evidence "presents a sufficient disagree-
ment" or "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." 65
In discharging this task, courts must "bear in mind the actual quantum and
quantity of proof necessary to support liability," in order to determine whether
evidence is of "insufficient caliber or quality" as to preclude trial on the
merits.66 As observed by Justice Brennan in dissent, this approach marks a
significant departure from the traditional view that the measurement of the
"caliber and quantity" of evidence "could only be performed by weighing the
evidence": "[T]he Court's opinion is ... full of language which could surely
be understood as an invitation-if not an instruction-to trial courts to assess
and weigh evidence much as a juror would." 67
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. 376 U.S. at 279-80; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974) (concern
for the potential chilling effect of defamation actions is partially reflected in "clear and convincing" standard
ofproof for libel claims, as opposed to preponderance of evidence standard common to most civil litigation).
62. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984); cf. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2244 (1989) (criticizing
conventional view that Federal Rules "indiscriminately govern all kinds and types of litigation").
63. 477 U.S. at 250.
64. Id. at 252.
65. Id. at 251-52.
66. Id. at 254. See Kamp, Federal Adjudication of Facts: The New Regime, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
437, 456-67 (1989) (proof and support necessary in federal adjudication).
67. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). For an assessment of
pretrilogy summary judgment, see 10A C. WRIGHI, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC'ICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2730 (2d ed. 1983) (summary judgment improper where credibility issues are present); id.
at § 2732 (no summary judgment where complicated fact patterns present).
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Perhaps more striking than the language in Anderson is the actual holding
in Matsushita, a massive antitrust case involving the alleged dumping of
Japanese televisions on the American market. Here the Court upheld a grant
of summary judgment against plaintiffs, American manufacturers, despite the
submission of detailed and unrebutted expert reports supporting plaintiffs'
claims.68 The Court required the American manufacturers to "come forward
with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be
necessary," because "the claim was one that simply makes no economic
sense." 69 The Court found support for the proposition that the claim "makes
no economic sense" not from the record below but from a "consensus among
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful."70 The Court reached even further into the realm of fact-
finding71 to add, "[t]he alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does
not in fact exist."72 The Court's venture into economic theory provoked yet
another vigorous dissent, this time by Justice White who read in the majority
opinion an invitation to the district judge to "go beyond the traditional summary
68. Among the evidence was a three-volume report by Dr. Horace J. DePodwin, Dean of the Graduate
School of Business Administration at Rutgers University characterized by the district court as "by far the
most careful, scholarly, and disinterested of the reports submitted by the plaintiffs' expert witnesses." Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See also Stempel,
supra note 49, at 108-14 (reviewing factual record in Matsushita). The district court based its summary
judgment determination, in part, on its ruling that the report was inadmissible. The appellate court subse-
quently overturned the district court's exclusion of this report. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court did not address the evidentiary issue,
thereby leaving the Third Circuit's ruling on admissibility untouched. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 582.
69. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
70. Id. at 589. The Court's "consensus" regarding predatory pricing drew primarily from a defined
school of thought commonly associated with the law and economics movement at the University of Chicago.
See, e.g., Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981).
There are two fundamental problems with the Court's analysis. First, even if we assume the fact that
predatory pricing is rare, we do not thereby resolve the issue whether it was present in the particular case
of Japanese electronics manufacturers. Second, even if a consensus of commentators could be binding on
parties before the Court, the views of the commentators cited by the Court do not rise to the level of a
consensus, as evidenced by the significant literature concerning the identification and prevention of the very
conduct the Court dismisses as "rare"--predatory pricing. See, e.g., Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price
Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); Joskow & Klevorick,
A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
71. The Court's widespread review of the facts in Matsushita has prompted commentators to see in
this case "a novel willingness to weigh the proffered facts to determine whether a dispute of fact is actually
'genuine."' Warren & Cranston, Summary Judgment after Matsushita, I ANTtRUST 12 (Summer 1987).
72. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 592. According to the Supreme Court, the claim that a goal of the
conspiracy was to drive Zenith out of the market could not withstand summary judgment since "[t]he data
in the record strongly suggest that that goal is yet far distant." Id. at 591. Since the publication of this
opinion, Zenith, the last extant American manufacturer of televisions, has expressed interest in selling off
its remaining television manufacturing division. See Rudd, Zenith Posts Quarter Loss of$4 Million, Chicago
Tribune, Apr. 26, 1989, § 3 (Business), at 3, col. 3. There have also been significant concerns about
collusion and predatory pricing by Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, resulting in the voluntary
establishment of minimum-pricing systems for certain types of Japanese-produced microchips. See Pollack,
Europe Sets Prices for Japan's Chips, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at D5, col. 4.
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judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence
favors the plaintiff."73
As a consequence of the trilogy, the Court appears to have transformed
summary judgment from a mechanism for assuring a modicum of genuine
dispute in cases set for trial to a full dress-rehearsal for trial with legal burdens
and evidentiary standards to match those that would apply at trial.74 Indeed,
the trilogy can be read to "endorse summary judgment as a substitute for
trial." 75 Neither the dress-rehearsal analogy nor the trial analogy should ob-
scure the critical difference between summary judgment and trial: there is no
jury sitting as trier of fact and only plaintiffs are at risk of adverse final
judgment.76
C. Lower Court Applications of the Summary Judgment Trilogy
The summary judgment trilogy alters the conventional wisdom concerning
the limited availability of Rule 56. Traditionally, courts adhered to the view
that summary judgment should be "cautiously invoked" 7  and that it should
be denied wherever there is the "slightest doubt as to the facts" involved.71
Long lines of cases held that the burden of proving the absence of material
facts in dispute rests with movants.79 Additionally, courts would not grant
73. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600 (White, J., dissenting). The trail of Justice White through the trilogy
is rather mystifying. White provides the crucial fifth vote in Celotex, though apparently disagreeing with
the actual holding of the case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (White, J., concurring). White then authors
the majority opinion in Anderson which, in terms of its actual formulation of the altered summary judgment
standard for district court fact finding, is the most sweeping of the trilogy. Finally, White authors the bitter
dissent in Matsushita, accusing the majority of overturning settled law in assigning to the district judge "the
job of determining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not... 475
U.S. at 601.
74. See Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 433,
468 (1987) ("By reading backwards from the dircted verdict the Court transformed summary procedure
into a full trial-before-trial."); Kamp, Federal Adjudication of Facts: The New Regime, 12 AM. 3. TRIAL
ADVOC. 437, 456-57 (1989) (trilogy has "turned the summary judgment motion into a mini-trial").
75. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PrITr. L. REV. 725, 740 (1989).
76. The Supreme Court opened, and did not resolve, yet another issue of critical importance to plaintiff-
nonmovants. If summary judgment post-Celotex is to be viewed as a proving ground for plaintiffs to earn
their entitlement to go to trial, what becomes of issues or evidence not presented to the district court in
defense against the summary judgment motion? Conceivably, if trial is to be made available only insofar
as claims and evidentiary proof satisfy the higher, post-trilogy standard, plaintiffs may be barred at trial
from introducing evidence or raising arguments for all claims for which they had not established the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Celotex
raises this problem in defending the expansive new role of the district court when he refers to the district
courts being "widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long
as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence." Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 326 (emphasis added).
77. See 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 13, § 2712, at 587.
78. See id., § 2712, at 583.
79. See, e.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982); Mark v. Cape
Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (movant has affirmative burden of demonstrating
no factual dispute, "even though, as a defendant, he would have no burden if the case were to go to trial").
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summary judgment based on a weighing of factual inferences.8° Nor, would
they generally grant summary judgment when the issues in dispute turned on
subjective factors such as intent, knowledge or motivation."'
A post-trilogy review of lower court decisions reveals a widespread and
dramatic recasting of summary judgment doctrine by the lower courts. This is
clearly evident in the revision of the movant's burden in light of Celotex8 2 and
in the eased standards for the grant of summary judgment evident in Anderson
and Matsushita.3 Courts have shown a new willingness to resolve issues of
10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 67, § 2727, at 121-28.
80. See, e.g., Redna Marine Corp. v. Poland, 46 F.R.D. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also 10 C.
WRIGHlT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 13, § 2712.
81. See, e.g., Thombrough v. Columbus & Freenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985); Archer
v. Duteher, 733 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1984) (affidavit raising issue of intentional infliction of tort sufficient
to survive summary judgment); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Cases
where intent is a primary issue generally are inappropriate for summary judgment."); Charbonnages de
France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406,414-15 (4th Cir. 1979); 10A C.WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note
67, §§ 2727 n.20, 2730.
82. SeeBeattyv. Washington Metro. AreaTransit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117,1120 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (relying
on Celotex to reject requirement that movant support its motions with affidavits or other evidence negating
the nonmovant's claim, but indicating that movant still must argue in favor of motion for summary
judgment); Texas v. Allan Const. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1534 (5th Cir. 1988) (nonmovant must establish issues
of material fact "even where the party moving for summary judgment has not offered evidence negating
the opponent's claim"); Kaufmann v. Puerto Rico TeL Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir. 1988) (summary
judgment proper when nonmovant fails to support essential element of case); Honore v. Douglas, 833 .2d
565,567 (5th Cir. 1987) (movant for summary judgment must make initial showing negating "any disputed,
material fact;" party opposing motion must then "offer evidence reflecting the existence of one or more
genuine issues of material fact); Lake Nacimento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 977,
980 (9th Cir. 1987) (no requirement that summary judgment motion be supported by affidavits or other
materials); Pocahantas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 217 (4th Cir. 1987)
(summary judgment proper after movant points out deficiencies in plaintiff's case and plaintiff fails to
forecast hard proof); Windon Third Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987) (movant's burden "cannot be enhanced to require his proof of a
negative'). See generally, Note, Federal Summary Judgment. The 'New' Workhorse for an Overburdened
Federal Court System, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 955, 968-78 (1987) (reviewing lower court decisions in light
of Celotex).
83. The changes are observable in the recasting of summary judgment into a preferred procedure in
the Second Circuit, once a court of stalwart opposition to the use of summary judgment. See H.L. Hayden
Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys., 879 F2d 1005, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1989) ("encourage use of summary judgment
in complex cases to avoid unnecessary trials"); R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 107
(2d Cir. 1989) (discussion of liberal summary judgment standard in antitrust suit); Kronfeld v. TWA, Inc.,
832 F.2d 726, 739 (2d Cir. 1987) (Miner, I., dissenting) (where appropriate, summary judgment "should
be granted without hesitation"); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1987) (use of
summary judgment encouraged); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1986) ("It appears
that in this circuit some litigants are reluctant to make full use of the summary judgment process because
of their perception that this court is unsympathetic to such motions and frequently reverses grants of
summary judgment. Whatever may have been the accuracy of this view in years gone by, it is decidedly
inaccurate at the present time .... "), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987). But see Donahue v. Windsor Locks
Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1987) (decrying "frequency of cases in which [summary
judgment] is granted improvidently"). A similar expansion is occurring in administrative tribunals, see
Fletcher & Kunstadt, The Forty-Second Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 79
TRADEiARK REP. 757,757 (1989) (describing expanded use of summary judgment by the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), and in the current practice of
determining, at summary judgment, whether works subject to copyright infringement claims are "substantial-
ly similar." See Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,
784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986); Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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intent or motive at the summary judgment stage,' and, in the extreme version,
to grant summary judgment where "'taken as a whole, [plaintiffs' evidence does
not] exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certain-
ty ... '85
Lower federal courts have found that the trilogy "has increased the utility
of summary judgment. '86 Courts almost uniformly regard the movant's burden
under Celotex to be satisfied even by a "meager" showing, 87 yet mandate that,
even under such circumstances, "the non-moving party must shoulder a heavy
burden in order to survive summary judgment... .,,8 Considerable evidence
also supports the proposition that courts have taken Matsushita and Anderson
as an invitation to review more aggressively factual and evidentiary issues.
Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, "[i]f the factual context makes non-
moving party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more
persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is
a genuine issue for trial."89 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has been at the forefront
of expanding evidentiary review at the summary judgment stage of litigation,
stating: "No longer can it be argued that any disagreement about a material
issue of fact precludes the use of summary judgment."'
There is evidence in the post-trilogy case law that summary judgment has
moved beyond its originally intended role as a guarantor of the existence of
material issues to be resolved at trial and has been transformed into a mecha-
nism to assess plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing at trial. Consequently, courts
84. See Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954, 960-61 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding grant of summary
judgment against claim of intent to defraud); Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.
1987) (employment discrimination context); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1986)
(employment discrimination and ERISA context); Indiana Grocery Co. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 561 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (antitrust context); Wehrly v. American Motors Sales Corp., 678 F.Supp. 1366
(N.D. Ind. 1988) (age discrimination in employment context); Vargas v. Calabrese, Civ. No. 85-4725, at
24 (D.N.L, opinion of Feb 22, 1988) (on file with author). In Vargas, the district court granted summary
judgment to the lead defendant in a civil rights conspiracy case based on an affidavit and deposition
testimony of the defendant that she intended no harm. In granting summary judgment, the Vargas decision
weighed the evidence produced in close to 1,000 pages of affidavits, deposition testimony and public
documents raising inferential issues of conspiracy. See Cartagena, The New Summary Judgment Motion,
in 4 CIvuL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATrORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 115, 115-16 (B. Wolvovitz, ed.
1988) (discussing application of trilogy in Vargas). One of the present authors, Professor Issacharoff, served
as co-counsel with Mr. Cartagena in Vargas.
85. Bouillion v. Eli Lilly & Co., 677 F.Supp. 467, 471 (W.D. La. 1988) (quoting Norris v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, 495 So. 2d 976, 982 (La. App. 1986), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 85 (La. 1987)).
86. California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cin
1987).
87. Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 695 F. Supp. 253, 262 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
88. Id.
89. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis in original). Similarly, "it must be apparent on
summary judgment that Plaintiff will be able to present evidence at trial sufficient to allow a reasonable
jury to find that Plaintiff has proved his case by a preponderance." Wilson v. Popp Yam Corp., 680 F. Supp.
208, 210 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (emphasis added).
90. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d at 1468. See also Saenzv. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309,
1317-19 (7th Cir. 1988) (summary judgment proper where actual malice in libel case could not be
established according to appellate review of "caliber or quality" of evidence).
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
are utilizing summary judgment where the plaintiff-nonmovant is unable to per-
suade the district court that judgment for the defendant would be foreclosed
if the case were to come to trial. A particularly striking example is found in
Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,91 in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant
of summary judgment to a chemical manufacturer in a tort suit involving
exposure to a pesticide produced by the defendant. On facts reminiscent of
Matsushita, the district court granted summary judgment after excluding the
proposed testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, one Dr. Alfred Johnson. The
case is striking because the parties did not dispute the plaintiff's exposure to
the pesticide, the plaintiff's symptomology, or the fact that Dr. Johnson's tests
"support[ed] a conclusion that Viterbo had suffered from some sort of toxic
reaction."'92 Nonetheless, despite the court's acceptance of Dr. Johnson's
qualification as an expert and the absence of any opposing expert testimony
proffered by the defendant, the district court rejected Dr. Johnson's testimony
on the basis of its own assessment of the evidentiary weight to be given to his
testimony-rather than its admissibility under the rules of evidence.93 The
critical issue, according to the Fifth Circuit, was Johnson's admission that
"Viterbo's symptoms could have numerous causes ... ."94 As a consequence
of the plaintiff's expert's failure to foreclose the possibility of a jury finding
for the defendant,95 the Fifth Circuit found proper the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the issue of causation.96
91. 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
92. Id. at 423.
93. The district court concluded that Dr. Johnson's opinions were "subjective," that Viterbo failed to
react in the expected manner to subsequent exposures, that blood tests performed by Dr. Johnson revealed
the presence of other toxic substances, and that the reactions could have been attributed to a number of
causes. In addition, Dr. Johnson had relied on animal experiments involving exposure levels exceeding that
which Viterbo had experienced. Id. at 423-24.
94. Id. at 424.
95. Viterbo is not unique in resolving evidentiary issues of scientific testimony at the summary
judgment stage after the Supreme Court's trilogy. In In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp.
358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), for example, the district court similarly rejected plaintiffs' expert testimony at the
summary judgment stage. In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court determined that
plaintiffs' expert reports would not be admitted, inter alia, because they attempted to identify "the cause
of human illness based upon the results of animal tests," 706 F. Supp. at 367, and because they attempted
to rely on scientific studies of the long-term effects of exposures to PCBs in Japan and Taiwan in the late
1960's. According to the court, "[d]efendants argue[d] that it is bad science, and therefore inadmissible
evidence, to base conclusions regarding the health of our plaintiffs on what happened to these people." Id.
at 368.
96. The use of summary judgment to deny access to the jury seems particularly prevalent in toxic tort
cases where judges do not find the evidence probative. See, e.g., Washington v. Armstrong World Indus.
Inc., 839 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim of link between asbestos exposure and colon cancer);
Felgenhauer v. Texaco, Inc., No. 85-3671 (F.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11258)
(rejecting expert witness' claim of link between defendant's product and liver damage); see generally,
Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting
and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 9 n.40 and accompanying




Equally striking is the use of factfinding under summary judgment in the
en banc decision of the Seventh Circuit in UAW v. Johnson Controls.97 In a
sex discrimination case challenging the exclusion of women of child-bearing
age from industrial positions with significant lead exposures, the court relied
on extensive factual reviews of contested scientific evidence. Thus, the exposure
levels to lead in Johnson Controls were deemed significant based on the
testimony of a defense expert that identified only one child with a history of
hyperactivity that "could very well and probably was due to the lead that he
had," 98 as a result of his mother's exposure to lead while pregnant (even
though she did not work at Johnson Controls). By contrast, the court rejected
the opinions of plaintiffs' experts that exposure problems were not confined
to women. 99 The plaintiffs' experts supported their testimony with evidence
from two scientific studies, the first showing a correlation between male lead
exposure and changes in sperm shape and the second using animal studies to
indicate a relationship between male exposures to toxic substances and birth
defects."° As expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Easterbrook, the
employer's claim that only females' exposure to lead would endanger offspring
ran contrary to "an impressive array of studies linking lead with injury to the
male reproductive system, and thence to offspring." 101 Despite the conflicts
on material issues absolutely central to the disputed exclusion of women from
the workforce, the Johnson Control plaintiffs, in a fashion similar to Viterbo,
failed to survive summary judgment.
D. Beyond the Doctrines
Any assessment of the actual impact of the summary judgment trilogy in
the lifestream of litigation should look beyond the doctrinal level to see how
the alterations have played out in the district courts."° To this end, we have
reviewed all the published federal court opinions in the first quarter of 1988
that refer to Celotex,103 a total of 192 opinions. We eliminated 52 of the 192
97. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
98. Id. at 877.
99. Id. at 889-90.
100. Id. at 889.
101. Id. at 918. The court's discounting of these studies forms one of the issues on which the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari. 59 U.S.L.W. 3022 (1990).
102. See Carrington, supra note 8, at 2093 (commenting that "[ilt is still early to evaluate the trilogy's
effect on the realities of federal practice").
103. Research revealed that district courts routinely refer to Celotex in passing on motions for summary
judgment. The database was created by a Westlaw search for Celotex. The use of published decisions to
assess the impact of the trilogy in the district courts has limitations. Since only a small percentage of cases
are litigated to judgment, and since not all of these result in published opinions, the sampling problems are
readily apparent. Nonetheless, the decision as to which opinions to publish is made by the district court
judges with the clear aim of informing the bar about significant legal developments. Thus, our decision to
rely on published opinions is justified by the critical role of published opinions in shaping the perception
among the bar of how the courts are handling procedural issues. We selected 1988 as the year to review
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on the grounds that they involved cross-motions for summary judgment where,
of necessity, the parties have represented to the court that legal issues predomi-
nate and there are no issues of material fact in dispute. This left 140 contested
summary judgment motions from which the following observations may be
drawn:
1. Summary judgment is a defendant's motion. Of the 140 motions, 122
were made by defendants and 18 by plaintiffs.
2. The courts are encouraging the filing of summary judgment motions.
Although our analysis is limited to reported cases in which a higher
proportion of granted summary judgment motions would be expect-
ed,"° the unmistakable message to the bar is that district courts are
highly receptive to summary judgment motions and, indeed, that such
motions are being freely granted. Thus, summary judgments were
awarded defendants in whole or part in 98 cases and denied in only 24
(including one in which the complaint was dismissed on other grounds).
Summary judgments were awarded to plaintiffs in 16 cases and denied
in 2.105
3. At the doctrinal level, courts are not reviewing the sufficiency of the
defendant/movant's production. In 59 of the 98 cases (60%) in which
judgment was entered for defendant, the district court granted summary
judgment without any discussion of the sufficiency of the defendant's
production in support of the summary judgment motion. Moreover, the
courts in 12 of these cases did not discuss any evidence or documen-
tation introduced by defendants in support of the summary judgment
motion; instead, they based awards solely on the perceived insufficiency
of plaintiffs' production.
This review of the 1988 district court caselaw is fully consistent with a
recent study of all reported antitrust conspiracy decisions in the aftermath of
Matsushita."° The study found that summary judgment was entered for defen-
dants in 64 cases, that it was denied in only 13 cases, and that in no case was
summary judgment entered for plaintiffs; the study reported no decisions
entered after trial on the merits in an antitrust conspiracy case.107
in order to allow time for the trilogy to be absorbed into general legal practice.
104. Denials of summary judgment based on the existence of disputed factual issues appear less likely
to result in published opinions. Nonetheless, a sampling of published opinions is instructive because of the
educational role these opinions serve in informing the practice of the bar. A high level of grants of summary
judgment in published opinions thus will likely generate a larger summary judgment motion practice, despite
the fact that a significant portion of the additional motions for summary judgment will not be granted.
105. This group includes General Battery Int'l Corp. v. Union de Servicios y Mantenimientos
Industriales de Puerto Rico, 678 F.Supp. 33 (D.P.R. 1988), in which the court denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and entered summary judgment sua sponte for defendant.
106. Note, Summary Judgment in Federal Court: New Maxims for a Familiar Rule, 34 N.Y.L. SCH.




In sum, as revealed by the doctrinal and empirical reviews of the lower
courts, the increased availability of summary judgment alters the balance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants in the pretrial phases of litigation by
raising both the costs and risks to plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage
while diminishing both for defendants. By matching the doctrinal analysis of
the courts with their practices as revealed through published opinions it be-
comes evident that the summary judgment trilogy allows for summary judgment
without supporting affidavits, documents or other forms of evidence of record,
so long as the assertion of the absence of material facts in dispute is made by
the party not bearing the ultimate burden of proof-typically the defendant.
The consequences of such summary judgment procedures are twofold, as
we will elaborate in the economic analysis that follows. First, the courts have
sanctioned a cost-free motion for summary judgment in which the defendant-
movant need not bear the cost of creating a record in order to put the issue of
summary adjudication before the court. Second, the new summary judgment
standards increase the likelihood of a grant of summary judgment by encourag-
ing district courts to be more active in identifying the "genuine" issues that
require trial. Put another way, the Supreme Court trilogy encourages the grant
of summary judgment through an expansive view of the role of the trial court
in determining what issues merit presentation to the ultimate trier of fact. This
in turn significantly increases the risk of judgment against the
nonmovant-typically the plaintiff-and drives up the costs of perfecting the
evidentiary record against the risk of such judgment. Inspired by cases such as
Anderson, the new summary judgment standards are accompanied by an
increased attentiveness to the "due process" rights of the movants to quickly
remove cases from the federal dockets. As expressed by one district court,
"Rule 56 must be read.., as intended not just to protect nonmovants with real
claims but also to protect the rights of movants to dispose of claims without
a sufficient basis to go to trial."108
From the defendant's vantagepoint, therefore, the effect of the trilogy is
both to facilitate the process for making a summary judgment motion and to
increase the likelihood of success of such a motion. Conversely, the trilogy
increases the threshold burden on plaintiffs both by making summary judgment
more available to defendants and by forcing plaintiffs to shoulder the burden
of documenting the merits of their case at an earlier stage of the litigation. 109
We now turn to the consequences this reordering of procedural burdens in the
108. Mokelis v. Scientific Sys. Serv. Inc., 677 F. Supp. 378, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see also Paterson-
Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 996 (Ist Cir. 1988) (movant entitled
to dismissal of factually unfounded suits).
109. As a normative matter, it is difficult to see how such a straight line redirection of the balance of
power between the parties can be reconciled with claims that neutrality as between the interests of particular
groups of disputants is a "paramount value" in procedural rulemaking. See Carrington, supra note 8, at 2074
(characterizing neutrality as 'perhaps a paramount value").
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summary judgment trilogy creates by examining the altered economic incentives
for each party.
H. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Having identified the trilogy-produced alterations in summary judgment
doctrines, we now examine the predicted consequences of the new standards
on the behavior of litigants. These go beyond the simple disposal of meritless
cases that appears to have been the main motivation for the revised interpreta-
tion. To understand the impact of these alteyations, one must examine their
effect on the incentives they provide for both parties. 110 By examining the
incentives for settlement or non-settlement at different points in time and the
corresponding incentives for escalation of litigation, we assess the anticipated
consequences of the trilogy.
Our primary goal is to determine whether summary judgment is likely to
achieve the central objective of reducing litigation. To do so, we consider the
two ways in which summary judgment affects the extent of litigation: directly,
through the disposal of cases, and indirectly, through its impact on settlement.
In examining case disposal, we look first to see whether summary judgment
will screen cases selectively, eliminating a disproportion of nonmeritorious or
"strike suits," relative to other suits. In turning to impact on settlement, howev-
er, the analysis is more complex.
The impact of summary judgment on settlement can be measured in two
distinct ways: first, by the change in the proportion of cases that are settled
prior to trial, including those that settle after an unsuccessful summary judgment
bid, and second, by the settlement of cases at the outset of litigation, prior to
an anticipated move for summary judgment. The difficulty with these measures
is that there are different costs associated with each so they cannot be aggregat-
ed into a single measure of settlement. When parties settle after an unsuccessful
summary judgment bid, the costs prior to settlement are greater than when
parties settle at the outset, since expenses will have already been incurred in
the course of the litigation up through the summary judgment stage. To avoid
this problem, we also employ, as a measure of settlement, aggregate litigation
expenses borne by disputants. This second measure pays heed to the lower costs
associated with early settlement.
A second goal is to examine the consequences of summary judgment for
the distribution of wealth between plaintiffs and defendants. Again, this impact
can be assessed in two ways: by the change in settlement values resulting from
110. See Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 94 (1986) (examining
operation of Rule 68 from this dual-party perspective); Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow
ofthe Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 1. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Mnookin & Kornhaus-
er, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979).
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the liberalization of summary judgment and by the change in plaintiffs' willing-
ness to bring cases in the first place. We shall first examine the impact of
liberalized summary judgment without reference to additional complications
such as the strategic benefit that defendants may realize by forcing a disclosure
of plaintiffs' evidence, and without reference to the effect that the particular
incentives for repeat players may have in determining when summary judgment
is likely to be invoked. In a later section we relax these assumptions to obtain
a fuller picture of the ramifications of liberalized summary judgment.
In order to isolate the impact of the availability of summary judgment under
the trilogy, we compare the series of decisions faced by litigants in the presence
and absence of a summary judgment option. Figures 1 and 2 depict these
sequences of decisions in the form of decision trees, the first representing the
case of no summary judgment, the second introducing the option of summary
judgment. The trees consists of three components: decision points at which one
or both parties must make decisions (represented by rectangles); chance out-
comes (circles) designating the outcome of litigation; and payoffs (in brackets),
with the plaintiff's payoff listed first and the defendant's payoff listed second.
For illustrative purposes we track a hypothetical suit involving specific
monetary amounts through the decision tree. A more general algebraic treatment
is presented in the appendix. The critical features of our stylized example, de-
signed to replicate the summary judgment standard evolved through the trilogy,
are that the defendant has the option of moving for summary judgment, that
the option is cost-free to the defendant (in accord with Celotex), and that the
plaintiff is the party at risk who must expend substantial resources to defend
against the summary judgment motion."1
Our illustrative case involves a one million dollar claim in which the
plaintiff has an eighty percent chance of success on the merits and in which
both parties agree on this likelihood of plaintiff's success. Plaintiff's trial
expenses are $75,000; defendant expenses are $50,000.111 We assume that
111. These assumptions are a stylized rendition of the standards evolving from the summary judgment
trilogy as reflected in the data set at supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
112. The values are fixed for the purposes of the illustrative model. Clearly, the parties will make
strategic decisions about how much to spend at trial, and plaintiff will make strategic decisions about how
much to spend defending against the summary judgment motion. The formal algebraic treatment of the
options available to the parties, contained in the appendix, allows for the full range of decisions that can
be made by the parties.
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settlement prior to trial or to the filing of summary judgment motions is cost-
free.
Figure 1
Decision Tree without Summary Judgment
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When we introduce the summary judgment option, we assume that the
defendant incurs no expenses at the summary judgment stage, while the plaintiff
is assumed to spend $50,000. Furthermore, we assume half of plaintiff's
expenses in defense of the summary judgment motion ($25,000) to be recover-
able costs, which will carry forward to trial as expenses that would have been
incurred regardless of the summary judgment motion,"' and half ($25,000)
to be independent costs which would be incurred in defending against the
summary judgment motion proper.1 4 Thus, having spent $50,000 on summary
judgment, the plaintiff will only spend $50,000 on trial. Together with these
levels of expenditures, we assign to the defendant a ten percent chance of
prevailing on summary judgment.
113. This is again a stylized assumption, but one that corresponds to the situation confronting plaintiff
at the summary judgment stage. Since defense against a summary judgment motion requires the presentation
of evidence and affidavits, plaintiff will be forced to turn to the same sources of proof as would be utilized
at trial. The organization of documents into exhibits, the preparation of witnesses to secure affidavits, and
the marshalling of legal authority in support of plaintiff's claims overlap considerably with the plaintiff's
burden going into trial. Plaintiff's summary judgment production is neither completely separate from nor
completely congruent with plaintiff's production at trial. We have therefore assigned a partial overlap
between plaintiff's production for trial and for summary judgment such that defendant's motion for summary
judgment raises plaintiff's absolute costs to the amount that are devoted exclusively to the summary
judgment motion and shifts the temporal sequence of that part of plaintiff's expenses that would have been
borne at trial independent of the summary judgment motion.
114. As demonstrated in the appendix, the effects of the motion for summary judgment on expected
values of the case and the settlement zone will vary across the spectrum of the recoverability/nonrecover-
ability of summary judgment costs that would have been incurred at trial. For illustrative purposes we have
chosen a midpoint of half-recoverable, half-nonrecoverable. This is consistent with the burden on the
nonmovant to reduce the entire record to written form in a manner that imposes substantial independent




Dedsi n Tree ith Summary Judgment
yes/ , -SI i [S925.000, -SI.050000]
PloIntifi'
Settle? vetary
[e S,-S) NO0 Tra
Settle? .20
Defendant
No Defendant requests 
.ie..ty
sumrmary judgment? I-5MA.D.. -S..0,00
yes Defendant [-$50,000. 0]
.10
Plaintiff" S t [ -
, =ia ] Settl eine t /[S ,M000, - SS.000]
A. Summary Judgment versus No Summary Judgment
In the absence of a summary judgment procedure, a legal dispute can be
conceptualized as a two-stage process consisting of negotiations during the
pretrial phase of the case, followed by trial if negotiations fail to result in a
settlement. The introduction of summary judgment bifurcates this process into
two segments: a first round of negotiations followed by summary judgment,
and a second round of negotiations followed by trial. To predict the impact of
summary judgment we need to understand the incentives operating on the
parties in each of these segments, and to compare them to those that are
operative where no summary judgment procedure is available. The incentives
for settlement influence the magnitude of the settlement zones-the range of
settlements that both parties would prefer over continuing to trial or summary
judgment. From settlement zones it is possible to predict when the two parties
will settle if they resolve the dispute without going to trial. By examining how
different features of the case-award amount, legal expenses, probabilities of
prevailing at trial and summary judgment, etc.-influence settlement zones, it
is possible to analyze the impact of these variables on the expected outcome
of the case. Our goal in this section is to understand how rational economic
agents would behave in the presence and absence of summary judgment and
to predict how the interactions of such agents will influence the resolution of
the case.
We begin by examining a situation in which summary judgment is not an
option; we then analyze the diverse effects of introducing a summary judgment
option.
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1. No Summary Judgment
With no summary judgment, the parties' willingness to settle prior to trial
will depend upon the expected value of the claim to each party. These values
are defined by the minimum amount the plaintiff would accept in lieu of
pressing charges on the one hand, and the maximum amount the defendant
would pay on the other, the range of mutually accepted bargains between these
amounts is the settlement zone.115 These values, delineating the settlement
zone, depend on the award to be recovered if the plaintiff prevails, discounted
by the probability of prevailing. In our example, assuming that both parties are
risk neutral, the one million dollar claim in which the plaintiff has an eighty
percent chance of success has an expected value of $800,000. From that
$800,000 figure, we must subtract, for each party, the cost of litigating the
claim. Taking account of trial expenses, the plaintiff's expected value of going
to trial is $725,000 ($800,000 - $75,000); the defendant's expected loss is
$850,000 (-$800,000 - $50,000). The plaintiff would prefer any settlement that
provided a payment greater than $725,000 and the defendant would prefer any
settlement that provided a payment less than $850,000. By definition, the
settlement zone is the range between $725,000 and $850,000. We will adopt
the common assumption that parties will settle at the midpoint of the settlement
zone-in this case at $787,500.
From this example, it is apparent that the value of a claim depends not only
on the anticipated recovery but also on the probability of success and the costs
to be incurred. To the extent that either a plaintiff's likelihood of success
decreases or her costs increase, the expected value of the claim for plaintiff will
decrease. Similarly, if plaintiff's likelihood of success decreases and defendant's
costs remain constant or decrease, the expected value of the claim against
defendant will fall.
2. Summary Judgment
The introduction of summary judgment complicates the situation consider-
ably. With summary judgment, the initial value of the claim to both parties
depends on: (a) whether the defendant will, in fact, move for summary judg-
ment; (b) the probability that such a summary judgment motion will succeed;
and (c) the "recoverability" of plaintiffs' costs (defined as the degree to which
plaintiff's costs incurred at the summary judgment stage are recoverable costs
that carry over to trial).
115. The economic literature analyzes the likelihood of a particular case going to trial in terms of the
"scope' or "range" of settlement values available to the parties. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 L ECON. LIT. 1067, 1075-78 (1989). The early works
in this field are Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 LL. ECON. 61 (1971), Gould, The Econom-
ics of Legal Conflicts, 2 1. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973), and Posner, supra note 11.
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Let us begin by examining the last of these three factors, the impact of
which is least obvious. Suppose that the defendant has moved for summary
judgment, that the motion has failed, and that both parties are now contemplat-
ing settling prior to trial. The plaintiff has already spent $50,000, $25,000 of
which applies to trial, reducing her trial expenses from $75,000 to $50,000. The
zone of agreement now runs between $750,000 ($800,000 - $50,000) and
$850,000 ($800,000 + $50,000). The midpoint of the settlement zone is now
$800,000 instead of $787,500. The reason for the shift in the settlement zone
is that the plaintiff has less incentive to settle prior to trial as a result of having
already invested a substantial portion of her expected trial costs and therefore
faces reduced future litigation expenses. It is straightforward to show that the
settlement zone will shift upward as the percentage of plaintiff's expenses that
are recoverable increases. 1 6
When the defendant decides whether to move for summary judgment, two
considerations are relevant: the likelihood of prevailing and the increase in the
expected value of settlement should the bid fail as a result of the plaintiff's
reduced incentive to avoid trial. Consider the example illustrated in Figures 1
and 2. If the defendant fails to move for summary judgment, she is in the
situation illustrated in Figure 1 and can expect to settle at the midpoint of the
settlement zone: $787,500. If she does move for summary judgment, she has
a ten percent chance of losing nothing, and a ninety percent chance of losing
$800,000, the midpoint of the settlement zone after an unsuccessful summary
judgment bid, as calculated above. Her expected loss given summary judgment
is $720,000, well below the expected loss without a summary judgment option.
Thus, given the award amount, probabilities of success, and legal expenses in
our example, we would expect the defendant to move for summary judgment.
The plaintiff's expected gain is equal to $670,000, calculated as the likelihood
that she prevails at summary judgment times the expected settlement following
summary judgment (.9 x 800,000) minus her legal expenses ($50,000) which
are borne regardless of whether summary judgment succeeds or fails. The
settlement zone prior to summary judgment, therefore, lies between $670,000
and $720,000. If the two parties settle prior to summary judgment, we would
anticipate a settlement value of $695,000, a substantial reduction in defendant's
exposure from the baseline of no summary judgment where defendant's expect-
ed exposure was $787,500.
116. The settlement zone will also shift upward following an unsuccessful summary judgment bid if
a failed bid causes the parties to revise upwardly their estimates of the plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing
at trial-as with, for example, a resolution of a disputed legal issue at summary judgment. The effect of
such a revision, if anticipated by both parties, would be to lower settlement values at the outset, thereby
decreasing the wealth transfer from plaintiffs to defendants. The impact of the resolution of legal issues
would vary from case to case, depending on the centrality of unresolved standards of liability and whether
the case were to be tried by a judge or jury-the resolution of a summary judgment motion being more
dispositive in the former case than in the latter.
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B. Consequences of the Availability of Summary Judgment
The shifting of the settlement zones and the introduction of an additional
period of negotiations produced by summary judgment has diverse conse-
quences for the process and outcome of a legal dispute. First, it is likely to alter
settlement rates and aggregate legal expenses. By introducing two periods of
negotiation, summary judgment might be expected to increase the likelihood
of settlement. However, the settlement zone during each of these periods is
usually smaller that that prevailing during the single period of negotiation that
occurs in the absence of summary judgment. Moreover, failure to resolve the
dispute during the first period of negotiations results in expenditures by plaintiff
which are generally treated as deadweight losses from a societal perspective.
In the first subsection, we attempt to predict whether settlement rates and legal
expenses will be greater with or without summary judgment.
Second, as illustrated in the hypothetical by the shift in the initial anticipat-
ed settlement point from $787,500 to $695,000, the introduction of summary
judgment results in a wealth transfer from plaintiff to defendant. In the second
subsection we explain why this transfer occurs and pinpoint eight features of
the case that influence its magnitude.
Third, we will examine the impact of summary judgment on the selective
disposal of cases, given that the wealth transfer from plaintiff to defendant will
deter initiation of some suits. This subsection focuses on which cases will be
discouraged and, in particular, on whether summary judgment has a disproporti-
onately negative impact on non-meritorious "strike suits."
1. Impact on Settlement
The premise of the summary judgment trilogy is that a broader use of
summary judgment should help alleviate the burdens on the federal courts by
allowing pretrial disposition of meritless claims. However, any argument made
on behalf of systemic benefits cannot overlook the fact that even without
summary judgment only a small percentage of cases actually go to trial.117
In effect, the greatest screening mechanism on cases going to trial in the federal
judicial system is not any procedural rule at all but the private settlement of
disputes by the litigants. Thus, changes that facilitate judicial disposition of
cases but impede settlement may fail to relieve, if not exacerbate, court conges-
tion.
117. An extremely small percentage of cases filed in federal courts actually get to trial. McMunigal,
The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV.
833, 838 n.15 (1990) (5.3% of cases filed in federal courts reach trial); Priest, Private Litigants and the
Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. REV. 527,541 (1989) (roughly 5% of cases filed reach trial). Studies
of particular types of claims often report even greater settlement rates. See H. Ross, STrLED OUT OF
COURT: THE SOCIAL COST OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADjuSTmENTs 216 (1970) (95.8% settlement rate).
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The major incentive for settlement of legal claims is the prospect of expens-
es associated with litigation.118 Given risk neutrality, the settlement zone in
a straightforward legal dispute is as broad as the sum of the parties' legal
expenses. Therefore, it is natural-as well as customary in the legal and eco-
nomic literature-to assume that the likelihood of settlement is positively
related to the width of the settlement zone.119
Let us return once again to our hypothetical. In the absence of summary
judgment, the parties began the litigation with a settlement zone of $125,000,
representing the difference between plaintiff's expected value of $725,000 and
defendant's expected exposure of $850,000, and equal to the sum of the two
parties' anticipated litigation expenses. With the introduction of summary judg-
ment, the initial settlement zone is $50,000--equal to the plaintiff's anticipated
cost of defending against summary judgment. Assuming that the motion for
summary judgment is unsuccessful, then the subsequent settlement zone prior
to trial is $100,000. The narrowing of the settlement zone from the $125,000
that would have prevailed if trial were not preceded by summary judgment is
caused by the $25,000 in plaintiff's costs incurred in defending against summa-
ry judgment that are recoverable as anticipated trial expenses. Again this
recoverability is critical. If costs are not recoverable at all, the two parties
would face a settlement zone equal to $125,000. However, if plaintiff's expens-
es are carried forward 100%, the settlement zone shrinks even further to
$75,000.
Recall that there are two ways to measure litigation reduction: by the reduc-
tion in the proportion of cases that go to trial and by the reduction in the
aggregate legal expenses incurred by both parties. The impact of summary
judgment on the proportion of cases going to trial depends on whether settle-
ment is more likely to result from a one-stage process of negotiations with a
single large settlement zone, or from a two-stage process, each involving a
smaller settlement zone. In our hypothetical, without summary judgment, the
pretrial settlement zone is equal to $125,000. With summary judgment, negoti-
ations are divided into two sessions, the first, prior to summary judgment, with
a settlement zone equal to $50,000, the second, prior to trial, with a settlement
zone of $100,000. Intuitively, trial seems less likely in the latter case since the
reduction from $125,000 to $100,000 is small and there is some chance that
the parties vill settle prior to summary judgment despite the small size of the
settlement zone at that point.
118. See Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 197 (1987); cf. Schwab &
Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719,742-43 (1988)(applied to constitutional tort litigation).
119. See Coursey & Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and
Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 161, 162-63 (1988) ("Any mechanism that increases the
surplus from settlement [the settlement zone] ... increases the likelihood of settlement."); Cooter &
Rubinfeld, supra note 115, at 1076.
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Of course, the magnitude of the settlement zone following an unsuccessful
summary judgment bid depends on the degree to which plaintiff's expenses are
recoverable at trial. If such expenses were completely recoverable, resulting in
a post-summary judgment settlement zone of $75,000, summary judgment will
be less likely to result in settlement prior to trial. If plaintiff's expenses were
completely non-recoverable, then the post-summary judgment settlement zone
will be $125,000 and the parties will almost surely be more likely to settle prior
to trial than in the absence of summary judgment.' 2
In contrast to the uncertain impact of summary judgment on probability of
trial, it seems likely that summary judgment will generally increase litigation
costs. First, summary judgment introduces a significant up-front cost to the
plaintiff should the two parties fail to reach settlement during the first stage of
negotiations-a likely outcome given the small size of the settlement zone at
that point. Second, to the extent that plaintiff costs are not recoverable at trial,
summary judgment will increase aggregated trial costs. For example, in our
hypothetical, aggregate legal expenses for a case going through summary
judgment and to trial are $150,000, but only $125,000 for a case that does not
involve summary judgment.'
It is impossible to determine whether settlement probabilities or expected
litigation expenses are greater or smaller given summary judgment in all cases,
without specific knowledge of the size of the settlement zone. Thus, the impact
of summary judgment on settlement is ambiguous. However, it appears likely
that, in our hypothetical, summary judgment would decrease the aggregate
likelihood of going to trial but would increase expected legal expenses." The
latter conclusion follows from the high likelihood that plaintiff and defendant
will fail to agree prior to summary judgment, leading to an up-front exposure
on the part of the plaintiff.
There is an additional reason to be wary of blanket conclusions concerning
the impact of summary judgment on settlement. In a conventional legal dispute
120. We can formalize these intuitions by postulating a function L (settlement zone) that designates
the likelihood that the two parties will settle as a function of the magnitude of the settlement zone. Note
that with risk neutrality, the settlement zone is simply the combined expected litigation costs of the parties.
Returning to our hypothetical, in the absence of summary judgment, the proportion of cases going to trial
will equal 1 - L($125,000). With summary judgment, the likelihood of not settling prior to summary
judgment will be 1 - L($50,000), the likelihood of avoiding trial through defendant victory at summary
judgment is ten percent, and the probability of subsequent settlement is 1 - L($100,000). The overall
likelihood of trial is (1 - L($50,000)) x .9 x (1 - L($100,000)). While, for the most plausible L functions,
the latter will be smaller than the former, there are a range of convex functions for which the reverse is
true.
121. In the absence of summary judgment, the expected value of aggregate litigation costs in our
hypothetical is (1 - L($125,000)) x $125,000-i.e., the likelihood of not settling times the legal expenses
incurred given failure to settle. With summary judgment, the expected value is $50,000 x (1 - L($50,000))
+ $ 100,000 x (I - L($50,000)) x .9 x (1 - L($100,000)). For a wide range ofplausible L functions, the latter
is likely to exceed the former, in which case aggregate legal costs will be increased by the introduction of
summary judgment.
122. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the expressions representing settlement likelihoods
and expected costs. See supra notes 120-21.
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without summary judgment both sides simultaneously face strong incentives
for settlement. The prospect of litigation costs renders resolution of disputes
through litigation a negative sum game for the two parties. Summary judgment,
in effect, bifurcates bargaining into two distinct phases, one (prior to summary
judgment) in which the plaintiff has a strong desire to settle immediately, and
a second (after summary judgment is defeated, but before trial) at which the
tables have turned and the defendant disproportionately desires settlement.
Recall that in our hypothetical lawsuit, prior to summary judgment, the plaintiff
faces the prospect of an immediate payout of $50,000 to defend against the
anticipated summary judgment motion. Following an unsuccessful summary
judgment motion, however, plaintiff has spent a disproportionately greater
amount of her anticipated trial costs (because of the recoverability of some
summary judgment expenses as trial expenses) while the defendant faces the
full brunt of trial preparation. It may be much easier to reach settlement when
both sides simultaneously face out-of-pocket costs of not settling. When either
side is at a disadvantage relative to the other, the disadvantaged side may not
be willing to make the sacrifice logically called for by her weak position.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that bargainers are less likely to reach a
settlement when inequities of power exist between them than when they are
in positions of symmetrical power.11
In sum, we find that the likelihood of settlement following an unsuccessful
motion for summary judgment is less than the likelihood of settlement prior
to trial if summary judgment has not occurred. But the overall impact of
summary judgment, taking into account opportunities for settlement prior to
summary judgment and prior to trial, is indeterminate. Even taking into account
the likelihood that a successful summary judgment motion will terminate some
cases, it is not at all clear that the expansion of summary judgment yields the
intended consequence of decreasing the likelihood of trial. Furthermore, the
expansion of summary judgment will likely increase aggregate legal expendi-
tures, thus producing a corresponding deadweight loss to society.12
2. Wealth Transfer
Although not an intended consequence of the liberalization of summary
judgment, perhaps the most striking and unambiguous impact of the trilogy is
a transfer of wealth from plaintiffs to defendants. This is illustrated in our
hypothetical by the reduction in the anticipated settlement value from $787,500
123. See, e.g., Weg, Rapoport & Felsenthal, Two-Person Bargaining Behavior in Fixed Discounting
Factors Games With Infinite Horizon, in GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 24-8 (forthcoming 1990); H. RAIFA,
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 51-54 (1982).
124. See Bowles, Economic Aspects of Legal Procedure, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 191
(P. Burrows & C. Veljanovski eds. 198 1) ("Legal proceedings utilize economic resources that could be used
for other purposes.").
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
to $695,000 with the introduction of the summary judgment option. In the
appendix we show that the introduction of summary judgment will never
increase, and will often decrease, the value of the suit for plaintiffs and will
correspondingly benefit defendants for any award amounts, probabilities, and
levels of legal expenditures.
Furthermore, it is instructive to examine the particular features of a case
that are likely to increase or decrease the extent of this wealth transfer. The
most basic determinant of the size of the wealth transfer is the probability that
the defendant will prevail on summary judgment. In the example we have been
considering, if the defendant's probability of prevailing were five percent, the
settlement zone would run between $710,000 and $760,000, with a midpoint
of $735,000,11 substantially greater than the $695,000 that would be expected
if the probability of defendant success at summary judgment were ten percent.
Conversely, if the defendant's probability of prevailing were twenty percent,
the settlement zone would range from $590,000 to $640,000, with a midpoint
of $615,000.
Additionally, the transfer of wealth depends negatively on the degree to
which plaintiff's expenses incurred at summary judgment are recoverable for
trial. In our hypothetical, if expenses at summary judgment were completely
inapplicable to trial, then the parties would be expected to settle at the outset
at $683,750, a reduction from the anticipated settlement of $695,000 when
$25,000 of plaintiff's summary judgment expenses were recoverable at trial. 26
On the other hand, if plaintiff's expenses at summary judgment offset trial
expenses dollar for dollar, then the plaintiff would only expend $25,000 at trial.
The pretrial/post-summary judgment settlement zone would extend from
$775,000 to $850,000 with a midpoint of $812,500, and the anticipated settle-
ment point at the outset would be $706,250. This represents an increase from
the $695,000 that would prevail under the baseline assumption of fifty percent
recoverability. The settlement zone (and thus anticipated settlements) also will
be shifted downward, all else being equal, by an increase in plaintiff's legal
expenses at summary judgment or trial, or by a decrease in defendant's antici-
pated trial expenditures.
125. If the two parties fail to settle prior to summary judgment, they should anticipate settling prior
to trial for a payment of $800,000 from plaintiff to defendant. However, given a five percent chance that
the case will be disposed of at the summary judgment stage, the expected value of the transfer is only
$760,000 (.95 x $800,000). The defendant would prefer to pay any amount less than $760,000 rather than
proceed to summary judgment; the plaintiff, facing legal expenses of $50,000 at the summary judgment
stage, would rather receive payment greater than $710,000 ($760,000 - $50,000) than proceed to summary
judgment.
126. The $683,750 value is derived as follows: Given no recoverability, the zone of agreement at trial
would be identical to that given no summary judgment, and the midpoint of the post-summary judgment
settlement zone would be $787,500. Given summary judgment, there is a ninety percent chance of going
to trial, so the expected value at the outset is $708,750. However the plaintiff must expend $50,000 at
summary judgment, so the settlement zone extends from $658,750 to $708,760 with a midpoint at $683,750.
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We have seen how summary judgment emerges from the trilogy as an easy
or cost-free procedure for defendants to invoke, and as one that encourages
courts to summarily dispose of cases. The liberalized summary judgment
standards force additional costs onto plaintiffs at an earlier stage of the litiga-
tion and increase the likelihood of summary judgment being granted. These
effects of summary judgment under the trilogy trigger the wealth-shifting effects
just described.
3. Selective Disposal of Cases
The impact of summary judgment is most pronounced for cases that have
a high ratio of anticipated costs to anticipated recovery. This is the result of
the adverse impact of summary judgment on the expected value of litigation
for plaintiffs. As a result, the chilling effect on the initiation of lawsuits is
particularly pronounced for marginal or nonmeritorious lawsuits ("strike
suits") t27 in which the expected value of the plaintiff's claim does not cover
anticipated legal expenses. It is precisely the "in terrorem" value of such suits
that has long concerned the Supreme Courtts and has motivated various
proposed procedural reforms.129
By increasing the anticipated costs, summary judgment discourages a broad
spectrum of plaintiffs from entering the litigation arena. This effect can be seen
in three categories of cases: first, cases in which liberal summary judgment will
deter the ffling of novel legal claims as a result of the low probability of
success; second, cases where the higher costs associated with defending against
summary judgment will deter filing of well-established legal claims because
the anticipated reward is too small to justify suit; and, third, cases where
summary judgment will allow defendants to more effectively withstand strike
suits. Of these three groups of discouraged cases, only strike suits are a proper
target for removal from the judicial system. By definition, these are cases that
127. The concept of strike suits or nuisance suits is well developed in the legal literature and has been
used by courts for over forty years. For early references see Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S.
518, 525-26 (1947); id. at 534 (Reed, J., dissenting); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504,
506 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). The legal and economic literature has not developed a uniform definition of strike
or nuisance suits, although it is generally understood to mean "suit in which the plaintiff is able to obtain
a positive settlement from the defendant even though the defendant knows the plaintiff's case is sufficiently
weak that he would be unwilling or unlikely actually to pursue his case to trial." Rosenberg & Shavell, A
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). We define
a strike suit as one in which the expected value to plaintiff is zero or negative as a result of a low probabili-
ty of success but where the settlement value, defined as the midpoint of the settlement zone, is greater than
zero. In such circumstances, the sole incentive for bringing suit is the expectation of a negotiated wealth
transfer. We exclude from this category suits intentionally brought to change the positive law or expand
the realm of legal rights available to plaintiffs.
128. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975) (even marginal
complaint "has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial
so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment").
129. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CRVM PROCEDURE, § 3.11, at 154-55 (3d ed. 1985) ("incidence of
the strike suit has led to proposals for tightening the pleading rules").
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neither expand the realm of positive law nor vindicate pre-existing legal
rights.130
In effect, strike suits are cases initiated with the intention of extorting a
payment from the defendant by threatening a costly legal battle. In such cases,
the plaintiff cannot afford to, and thus has no actual intention of, actually going
to trial. Summary judgment disproportionately screens strike suits because
nonmeritorious cases are unlikely to have a sufficiently developed factual record
capable of withstanding summary judgment. Since plaintiffs in such suits are
not prepared to commit significant resources to pursuing the litigation, it is also
unlikely that they will be able to develop a factual record by extensive use of
depositions or other cost-intensive forms of discovery. This effect is com-
pounded by the fact that summary judgment shifts plaintiff's costs forward in
time-effectively allowing defendants to force poorly capitalized plaintiffs to
incur expenses early in the case while themselves incurring no reciprocal
obligation. Forcing such up-front expenditures by plaintiffs further undermines
strike suits due to the fact that the monetary judgment to be extracted from the
defendant is unlikely to compensate sufficiently for such out-of-pocket costs.
In our hypothetical, the plaintiff's claim is not a strike suit since the expect-
ed value of plaintiff's claim exceeds anticipated legal expenses. Suppose,
however, that instead of an eighty percent chance of the plaintiff prevailing at
trial, there were only a 7.5 % likelihood. Assuming no intent on plaintiff's part
to stake out novel legal claims, such a case would qualify as a strike suit since,
without summary judgment, the expected value to plaintiff would be zero ($1
million x .075 - $75,000 in anticipated litigation expenses). The plaintiff would
have no incentive to invest in this litigation, since the expected return is zero.
However, since the expected exposure of defendant would be $125,000, the
settlement zone still stretches between $0 and $125,000, giving a cagey plaintiff
incentive to invest minimally in hopes of inducing a settlement within the
settlement zone, or, if such a settlement were not forthcoming, quickly abandon-
ing the case. Providing defendant with a weapon that will increase plaintiff's
up-front costs eliminates the viability of a strike suit strategy, since plaintiff
is unlikely to commit significant resources to the litigation in light of the
marginal expected return. Moreover, the additional costs imposed by summary
judgment would create a negative expected value for plaintiff, again discourag-
ing this type of litigation. Plaintiff's aggregate costs of going to trial would be
$100,000 ($50,000 at summary judgment and $50,000 at trial), while the
expected gain would be $75,000.
130. This conclusion follows from the definition we have used for strike suits. Since, as we have
established, such cases do not seek to expand the realm of legally recognized rights, do not seek to vindicate
pre-existing rights of limited monetary value, and do not have any positive externalities, it is difficult to
articulate any social utility for such suits. Accordingly, the benefits of liberal summary judgment should
be greatest here insofar as this procedure allows for an expeditious weeding out of cases whose adjudication
would contribute little to the expansion or delineation of legal rights.
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Thus, the temporal shift in plaintiff's costs and the diminished expected
value of plaintiff's claims will make strike suits increasingly unviable and
facilitate their expeditious removal from the dockets. However, summary
judgment under the trilogy remains a powerful but blunt instrument;131 while
it will no doubt excise strike suits, liberal summary judgment is not sufficiently
finely-honed to distinguish sharply between, on the one hand, genuine strike
suits and, on the other, cases of limited monetary value132 or cases seeking
to establish novel legal claims.
C. When Will Defendants Move For Summary Judgment?
We have thus far identified various effects of liberally-applied summary
judgment: the dismissal and discouragement of strike suits, the impact on settle-
ment rates, and the shift in value of litigation. These impacts all occur only
when the defendant is able to make a credible threat to move for summary
judgment at the pre-summary judgment stage. As we shall now see, where there
is no basis for the motion, there is no benefit to defendant in moving for
summary judgment. We now turn, therefore, to an analysis of when it is in the
defendant's interest to move for summary judgment.
To predict when the defendant will move for summary judgment, it is
important to understand that summary judgment has a benefit and cost to the
defendant. Leaving aside for the moment the litigation-specific strategic benefits
that summary judgment may offer, the major benefit of summary judgment to
the defendant is the possibility that she will prevail on the motion. The greater
the likelihood of such an outcome, the more advantageous is summary judgment
and the lesser is the defendant's anticipated settlement at the outset.
The major cost of summary judgment is the shift of the settlement zone and
subsequent increase in the anticipated settlement amount if summary judgment
should fail. This shift, as we demonstrated earlier, depends in large part on the
degree to which plaintiff's expenses incurred in defending against summary
judgment are recoverable as avoided trial expenses.
131. In the words of Professor Carrington, "the trilogy has made Rule 56 a more powerful engine than
the Civil Rules Committee contemplated when it first commenced re-study of the [summary judgment] rule
in 1985." Carrington, supra note 8, at 2093.
132. The relation between litigation potential and settlement cannot be ignored. For cases of limited
economic claims, the broad-scale increase in plaintiff's up-front expenditures effectively dooms the prospect
of enforcing viable legal claims. As one commentator has expressed, "settlement outcomes reflect in some
measure the potential results and costs of litigation .... Power to achieve an attractive settlement may be
dependent on having adjudication as a viable alternative." Galanter, The FederalRules and the Quality of
Settlements: A Comment on Rosenberg's, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2231, 2234 (1989). See also McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11, 46 (1984) ("[T]he most important cost of rules
and procedures that deny the poor and weak access to adjudication may be that the disadvantaged are thus
effectively denied the opportunity to settle claims informally.").
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Our hypothetical again provides an illustration. Returning to the original
premise, if the defendant's probability of prevailing at summary judgment drops
from ten to two percent, and if plaintiff's expenses at summary judgment are
one hundred percent recoverable, then the defendant's expected loss after filing
for summary judgment would be $796,250. This is calculated by discounting
the midpoint of the post-summary judgment settlement zone by the probability
of defendant winning at summary judgment; this would be .98 x 812,500.
Since, in this situation, the defendant's loss is greater given summary judgment
than without summary judgment, summary judgment provides no leverage and
she can minimize losses by settling at the no-summary judgment value of
$787,500.133
What we see, therefore, is that, first, a defendant with a weak case does not
benefit from the promiscuous filing of a summary judgment motion. Second,
when a large fraction of plaintiff's expenditures on summary judgment are
applicable to trial, filing the motion will be relatively less advantageous for the
defendant. In the appendix, we demonstrate further that the defendant is more
likely to move for summary judgment when the stakes in the litigation are high.
The greater the potential exposure, the less significant the marginal cost of the
summary judgment and, hence, the marginal loss resulting from an elevated
settlement zone in the event summary judgment fails. We also show that the
greater defendant's anticipated litigation costs and the smaller the plaintiff's,
the more advantageous summary judgment becomes for the defendant."
III. FURTHER RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT TRILOGY
In order to identify the most basic consequences of the summary judgment
trilogy, our economic analysis made a number of simplifying assumptions. First,
we assumed that the legal case is a one-shot affair between plaintiff and
defendant so that neither side is concerned with confronting the other again in
the future or in establishing a public reputation. Second, we assumed that both
parties possessed complete knowledge of the facts of the case, including one
another's trial strategies. Third, we assumed that the parties are economically
133. The failed summary judgment motion may also have consequences for both parties' perceptions
of plaintiff's probability of success. In our example, plaintiff's initial probability of success was set at eighty
percent, reflecting both problems of proof and issues of law that may be resolved against plaintiff. If plaintiff
survives summary judgment, problems of proof may still be present for trial, but any issues of law will have
been resolved in plaintiff's favor. This in turn may affect the bargaining posture of the plaintiff since the
probability of success ratio will reflect the favorable resolution of legal issues in plaintiff's favor. See also
supra note 116.
134. This follows from two base line points of analysis. First, the probability ofjudgment for plaintiff
is a function of each side's legal expenditures. See Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll be
Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989). Second, as a general proposition, the greater the potential gain
from litigation, the greater the marginal value of resources devoted to litigation by each party. See Katz,
Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1988); see generally,
Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 115, at 1073.
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rational in the sense of assessing probabilities efficiently and without bias, as
well as in their weighing of the various costs and benefits of different options.
Here, we examine the impact of modifying these assumptions in a realistic
manner. First, we consider the problem of repeat litigants-primarily defen-
dants-for whom there is a value in establishing a reputation in cost-intensive
litigation practices independent of the cost calculus of any particular piece of
litigation. Second, we relax the assumption of complete knowledge. If parties
are not aware of one another's trial packages, there may be an independent
strategic benefit for defendants to force plaintiffs to reveal their trial package.
This is particularly true in light of Justice Rehnquist's cryptic reference in
Celotex to the plaintiff's need to "produce all of her evidence." 13 Third, we
examine the impact of two psychological phenomena that are likely to influence
litigants' behavior: overconfidence and failure to ignore sunk costs.
A. Repeat Litigants
As we demonstrated above, the summary judgment trilogy, which reduces
the movant's burden of production and increases defendant's probability of
prevailing, constitutes, in effect, a wealth transfer from plaintiffs to defendants.
When we introduce the potential for repeat litigation, this impact is, if anything,
amplified.
The problems posed by the repeat-litigant status of defendants points to the
basic inadequacy of analyzing litigation incentives from the vantagepoint of an
isolated case scenario. So long as both parties to the litigation look solely to
the controversy at hand, the incentives for litigation strategies, including costs,
will be directed by the amount at stake and the prospects of each side prevail-
ing.136 Where, however, one of the parties is motivated by future concerns
extrinsic to the immediate lawsuit, that party's litigation effort will grow.137
As Posner argued, "[a] rational threatener involved in a sequence of similar
legal disputes with different people might carry out a threat to overspend in one
dispute in order to establish the credibility of similar threats in the other cases."'38
Repeat litigation exacerbates the wealth transfer from plaintiff to defendant
if defendants are more likely than plaintiffs to be repeat players in litiga-
135. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326. See supra note 76.
136. This point is made by Professors Cooter & Rubinfeld: "If both parties are only interested in
winning the stakes in this trial, rather than being interested in the law or reputation or future disputes, then
the levels of effort chosen and trial outcomes will depend on the relative productivities of both parties"
Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 115, at 1073.
137. Cooter and Rubinfeld analyze this problem from the vantagepoint of a Nash game where the
parties have an initial fifty percent chance of winning. They conclude that not only will litigation efforts
and expenditures grow, but "the probability of winning will increase for the party with a future interest in
victory." Id. at 1074.
138. Posner, supra note 11, at 432 (emphasis in original).
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tion.139 Repeat litigants may want to give the impression of being trigger-
happy when it comes to summary judgment-or moving even when it makes
no sense in the narrowly construed terms of an individual case. Persuaded of
a defendant's readiness to move for summary judgment, plaintiffs may be
dissuaded from filing suit by the prospect of high investment levels prior to
potential recovery.l4° Summary judgment may prove an attractive weapon for
such repeat litigants even when the likelihood of obtaining summary judgment
is minute.
B. Strategic Benefits of Summary Judgment
Contrary to our stylized assumption that both parties possess all relevant
information at the threshold of a suit's liability stage, the point at which parties
typically move for summary judgment, the potential for substantial uncertainty
exists, particularly concerning the opponent's trial package. The availability to
defendants of cost-free summary judgment encourages strategic use of the
device to force plaintiff revelation of her trial strategy."'
Advocates of summary judgment present it as one of many procedural
mechanisms facilitating information exchange. 42 However, given the fact that
the defendant generally has more relevant factual information than the plain-
tiff," this information transfer from plaintiff to defendant is unlikely to aid
parties in reaching settlement.1" A defendant tempted by the strategic benefits
139. See generally Perloff & Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation, in PRIVATE
ANTITRUST L1TIGATION (S. Salop & L. White eds. 1987) (reviewing litigation advantage by large institutional
defendants in antitrust suits), at 62-70.
140. As Priest & Klein argue, in situations involving one repeat player, "the stakes will almost surely
differ between the parties, because the alternative costs of their future activities are unlikely to be equal."
Priest & Klein, The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13 L LEGAL STUD. 1, 28 (1984). See also Galanter,
Vhy the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc. REV. 95
(1974) (predicting repeat players more likely to prevail in litigation).
141. Similarly it has been argued that "parties have an incentive to conduct discovery proceedings to
probe for weaknesses in the opponent's case that the looseness of the federal pleading requirements may
enable the opponent to conceal in his pleadings." Posner, supra note 11, at 427.
142. See, e.g., id., at 435 (describing summary judgment as one of the "[m]any familiar procedural
devices... designed, in part at least, to reduce the expense of litigation").
143. The presumption of information relevant to the assessment of liability being in the hands of
defendants is central to the liberal procedural rules reflected in notice pleading and broad discovery. See
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (setting forth requirement that pleading only put defendant on notice
of nature of claim); see also Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L REV. 806, 818-19 & n.59 (1981) (liberal discovery a
stimulus to expansion of substantive remedies); Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 441-42 (1986) (liberal pleading tied into pro-plaintiff
substantive law changes).
144. In fact, one might argue that to the extent that revealing information is in the interest of both
parties, such information will be revealed by plaintiffs in the course of trying to obtain a favorable
settlement. This flows from Professor Shavell's analysis of the incentives for the voluntary production of
information by plaintiffs. Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, RAND L ECON.
(1989-forthcoming). According to Shavell, voluntary disclosure of information will yield an equilibrium
in which plaintiffs who stand to benefit from revealing additional information will do so, while those whose
bargaining position will not be benefitted will not provide additional information. It follows that forcing
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of cost-free summary judgment would not be seeking information about the
potential sources of liability but about plaintiff's ability to arrange and present
that information so as to obtain a tactical advantage at trial. The only new
information likely to emerge under this scenario is a free peek at the plaintiff's
trial tactics. Summary judgment under Celotex provides a unidirectional rule
allowing defendants to force plaintiffs to reveal trial strategies while not forcing
reciprocal disclosure by defendants. Given the value of this information,14
strategic misuse of summary judgment must be considered a real possibili-
ty.146
C. Overconfidence
Although we assumed in our economic analysis that both sides drew similar
conclusions about the relevant probabilities from the available evidence, more
probably litigants will be "mutually optimistic" about their chances of prevail-
ing at trial. Mutual optimism can explain the failure of parties to settle out of
court,147 as Posner speculates, 1 4  and, in fact, much evidence supports this
claim.149 For example, parties in arbitrated conflicts tend to overestimate their
all plaintiffs as a class to reveal more information than they otherwise would diminishes the bargaining
position of plaintiffs and benefits defendants as a class.
145. "Each party has an incentive to withhold information at the settlement negotiation, knowing that
if negotiations fail, the information will be more valuable at trial if the opponent has had no opportunity
to prepare a rebuttal to it." R. POSNER, supra note 33, at 526.
146. It therefore comes as no surprise to find among the growing legion of Rule 11 sanctions cases
awards for the misuse of summary judgment. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesell-
schaft, 855 F.2d 385, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming order that defendant pay plaintiff reasonable
attorneys' fees spent opposing summary judgment motion on an issue previously foreclosed).
147. Since litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the parties, meaning that their aggregate wealth
will be lessened by litigation, one wonders why litigation should occur with the frequency and intensity
that it does. The issue, therefore, is to explain why parties will litigate their disputes rather than settling.
Some authors believe that lawsuits occur because some parties will naturally overestimate their chances of
winning. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 3. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). One study
has shown that it is possible to approximate actual litigation rates by examining the likelihood that optimists
who overvalue their relative legal positions will collide. Thus, under reasonable assumptions, the Priest &
Klein model can approximate the litigation rates that actually occur. Silver, Do We Know Enough About
Legal Norms, in THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE (D. Braybrooke, ed.) (forthcoming 1991). For further
discussion of the literature attributing litigation to optimism, see Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts,
2 . LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
(1979); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
148. The contraposition of "mutual optimism" with "mutual pessimism" is taken from Posner, supra
note 11, at 423. The potential reduction in mutual pessimism is attributed to the generation of "information
about the opponent's case that causes a party to become more optimistic." Id. Nonetheless, Posner discounts
any impact that this phenomenon might have on settlement rates.
149. For a comprehensive overview of the literature on overconfidence, see JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 287-355 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky, eds. 1982).
Overconfidence may result, in part, from the tendency of parties to assess fairness in a biased manner that
favors themselves. For a discussion of fairness biases, see Messick & Cook, Psychological and Sociological
Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Convergent, Divergent, and Parallel Lines, in EQUITY THEORY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (D. Messick & K. Cook, eds. 1983).
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own likelihood of prevailing.150 In both arbitration and litigation a last resort
decisionmaker gives the parties a strong external referent. Despite the presence
of a final resolution by an outside agent, overconfidence by the disputants
diminishes the settlement zone, pushing both parties towards trial and, commen-
surately, preventing settlement.
The common wisdom maintains that increasing the information available
to parties will cause their probability estimates to converge. As Posner ex-
pressed,
a full exchange of the information in the possession of the parties is
likely to facilitate settlement by enabling each party to form a more
accurate, and generally therefore a more convergent, estimate of the
likely outcome of the case .... 151
Convergence of beliefs upon receipt of common information should reduce the
"mutual optimism" identified as a principal source of litigation and, concomi-
tantly, as a primary obstacle to settlement.1 52
However, there is good reason to question the assumption that added
information leads to convergence of subjective beliefs. Several studies have
found exactly the opposite effect; namely, new information received by two
parties with polarized views can further exacerbate the discrepancy between
them. For example, in one study 153 subjects who were in favor of or opposed
to capital punishment were asked to provide assessments of the deterrent effect
of the death penalty. Not surprisingly, these estimates differed substantially for
the two groups. Proponents and opponents were then both given the same two
academic journal articles to read. One found evidence of a deterrent effect of
capital punishment, the other of which reached the opposite conclusion. As a
result of exposure to these articles, instead of converging in their beliefs, both
groups moved further toward extremes. Each group found the methodology of
the study that supported its preexisting belief to be more convincing and tended
to view the conflicting research as flawed. 54
Otherresearch with ramifications for litigant behavior concerns the disparity
between increases in confidence as compared with accuracy as people receive
150. See Farber & Bazerman, Divergent Expectations As a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining:
Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes, 104 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1989); Bazerman & Neale,
Improving Negotiation Effectiveness Under Final Offer Arbitration: The Role of Selection and Training,
67 L APP. PSYCHOLOGY 543 (1982).
151. R. POSNER, supra note 33, at 525.
152. Posner, supra note 11, at 422-26.
153. Lord, Lepper & Ross, BiasedAssimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effect of Prior Theories
on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 . PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 2098-2110 (1979).
154. Biased interpretation of evidence has also been observed in competitive negotiations. Parties tend
to interpret the facts in a dispute in a biased manner that favors themselves. The magnitude of the two
parties' "egocentric" biases is a strong predictor of failure to settle disputes and of joint losses where failure
to settle is costly. See Thompson & Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal
Conflict, - ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES - (forthcoming, 1990).
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increasing amounts of information. In one study conducted by Oskamp, psychi-
atrists were given successively increasing amounts of information about pa-
tients.155 Oskamp found that, as they received more information, psychiatric
clinicians grew increasingly confident about their diagnoses and that their confi-
dence continued to increase long after their actual judgmental accuracy had
reached a plateau.
When applied to litigation, these findings challenge the conventional
wisdom that more information mitigates mutual optimism and increases willing-
ness to settle. Instead, it appears, new information has the potential to exacer-
bate overconfidence, particularly when parties are polarized to begin with. To
the extent that summary judgment leads to sharing of information, therefore,
its impact on settlement is by no means obvious.
D. Failure to Ignore Sunk Costs
The so-called "sunk cost" fallacy is a second psychological phenomenon
with ramifications for summary judgment. Although economists exhort decision-
makers to ignore sunk costs and to attend only to the prospective benefits and
costs of alternative courses of action, few attain this ideal. Instead, individuals
often incur further losses ("throw good money after bad") or take great risks
in order to recover those losses. The tendency for investors to hold losing
stocks, even at the expense of substantial tax benefits, or the tendency for labor
disputes to "escalate" after both sides have borne losses from a strike, are both
commonly cited illustrations of the failure to ignore sunk costs.156
The sunk cost fallacy has consequences for summary judgment because
summary judgment is likely to increase the up-front expenditures of the non-
movant. Recall that the settlement zone prior to summary judgment is relatively
small ($50,000 in our hypothetical). Given our assumption that settlement
probability is positively related to the size of the settlement zone, agreement
is relatively unlikely at this stage. At the next stage, where defendant and
plaintiff face additional expenditures at trial, the settlement zone should be
larger and settlement commensurately likely.
The sunk cost effect, however, may counteract, to some degree, the increase
in settlement likelihood that would otherwise occur following an unsuccessful
bid for summary judgment. Once the plaintiff has expended resources defending
against summary judgment, she may seek to recoup that expenditure by increas-
ing demands during pretrial negotiations. Note that when summary judgment
expenses are recoverable, some acceleration of demands is warranted from a
155. Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 . CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 261,261-65
(1965).
156. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course ofAction, 18 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 57,57-61
(1975). See also Shefrin & Statmnan, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long:
Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 777-90 (1985).
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purely economic perspective. The failure to ignore sunk costs will, however,
further increase those demands. Acceleration of plaintiff demands above and
beyond what is called for by the change in economic incentives will decrease
the likelihood of settlement since the defendant does not experience a compara-
ble bias. The sunk cost fallacy, therefore, like the tendency for new information
to increase overconfidence, will interfere with settlement.
IV. MODIFICATIONS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We have shown above that the liberalized summary judgment standards for
defendants may have consequences other than those intended. Almost inevitably
these summary judgment standards shift wealth from plaintiffs to defendants,
and they may not achieve their primary purpose of reducing litigation. Is it
possible to devise modifications that avoid these adverse consequences? Here
we examine modifications that are intended to discourage the frivolous or
strategic misuse of summary judgment by defendants, thus limiting the wealth
transfer in their favor. Our proposed modifications rely on the three principle
deterrents already established in American law to control litigation abuse: issue
preclusion,1 7 fee shifting,158 and sanctions.5 9
These modifications seek to discourage unwarranted use of summary judg-
ment as a defendant bargaining tool by deterring its use where the probability
of success is low. In light of the problems with the altered summary judgment
standards raised above, these modifications also seek to: (a) selectively screen
strike suits without compromising the viability of other meritorious suits; (b)
decrease or not increase the likelihood that the parties will go to trial; and (c)
decrease or not increase the deadweight loss to society resulting from large up-
front expenditures.
A. Subsequent Preclusion of Evidence
One possible modification of summary judgment is to preclude a defendant
who moves without substantiation from later introducing any evidence that was
available, but not presented in support of the summary judgment motion.160
This will raise the up-front cost to the defendant of moving for summary
judgment, since defendants who move without incurring the expenditures
involved in gathering and presenting evidence will find themselves vulnerable
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) which allows for the preclusion of claims or defenses, or the
designation of facts that shall be taken as established, as a sanction for discovery abuse.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(E) (providing for the assessment of reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, for discovery abuse).
159. FED. R. CIV. P. i1.
160. For a discussion of the use of evidence or issue preclusion, see Louis, Discretion or Law:
Appellate Review of Determinations That Rule 11 Has Been Violated or That Nonmutual Issue Preclusion
Will Be Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C.L. REv. 733, 753-57 (1990).
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at trial should the plaintiff prevail at summary judgment. This modification
eliminates the defendant's ability to wait until learning the outcome of the
summary judgment bid before preparing and documenting her case. It forces
defendants with marginal summary judgment motions to expend resources in
documenting the basis for the summary judgment motion, thereby reducing the
likelihood of frivolous use of summary judgment. On the other hand, to the
extent that summary judgment discourages strike suits, this modification will
weaken this desirable effect by forcing defendants to spend substantial sums
up-front in order to take advantage of summary judgment.
Other significant drawbacks to this approach also exist. Forcing the defen-
dant to incur extra expenses in summary judgment proceedings front-loads
expenses that in turn lead to greater deadweight losses if the case fails to settle
prior to summary judgment but does settle prior to trial. Moreover, the type of
expenditures defendants incur at the summary judgment stage will typically be
largely recoverable at trial,"' so that following a defeat of summary judg-
ment, the defendant's subsequent burden will be reduced and, therefore, her
incentive to avoid trial. Forcing the defendant to incur expenses up-front
reduces the post-summary judgment settlement zone, which in turn reduces the
likelihood of settlement if the two parties fail to settle at the outset and if the
plaintiff prevails on summary judgment.
Given that this modification will not necessarily promote settlement, we
must consider what its effect will be on overall defendant expenditures. This
turns out to be ambiguous. On the one hand, a defendant may spend extensively
at the summary judgment stage in order to preserve the ability to fully defend
at trial. On the other, the defendant may be disinclined to invest significantly
in summary judgment if there is a reasonable prospect of ending the litigation
either through settlement or through the actual grant of summary judgment. The
relative importance of these two incentive effects cannot be determined without
specifying the details (award amount, expenses, etc.) of a particular case.
B. Shifting Fees and Costs
Another alternative is to provide a defendant with two options: moving
without expenditures but immediately reimbursing plaintiff's attorneys' fees and
costs should the bid fail (in effect, the English system), or moving with some
minimum level of expenditure to avoid the possibility of fee shifting. An
obvious problem with this approach is that it adds an additional layer of court
inquiry onto determination of the case-specific minimum level of expenditure
161. Typically, the evidence introduced in support of a motion for summary judgment will consist of
witness statements reduced to affidavit form, documentary exhibits, and redactions of depositions. Each of
these would be presented in some form were the case to reach trial. Accordingly, forcing a defendant to
prepare this earlier in the litigation will reduce the defendant's trial costs correspondingly.
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to document credibly the motion for summary judgment. However, courts that
have passed on the merits of a summary judgment motion are well-situated to
determine whether the motion had substantial support or relied simply on an
assertion that no issues of material fact were in dispute.
The use of fee shifting discourages defendants with low probability summa-
ry judgment motions from moving for summary judgment. At the same time,
this approach still leaves the defendant the option of moving for cost-free
summary judgment to ward off strike suits, presumably a high probability
motion. Although defendants who may seek to avail themselves of cost-free
summary judgment to ward off strike suits still face risks, the consequences
would not be as prejudicial to the defendant's case on the merits as would the
evidence preclusion alternative discussed previously. In the fee-shifting scenar-
io, a defendant who fails in a cost-free summary judgment motion must absorb
the plaintiff's summary judgment costs but remains free to defend fully should
the case come to trial. In the issue-preclusion scenario, by contrast, such a
defendant would be unable to defend fully by introducing all favorable evi-
dence.
The drawbacks to the use of fee shifting are particular to each of the
alternatives available to defendants. If the defendant chooses to move for
summary judgment cost-free, the potential for fee shifting reduces the marginal
cost to the plaintiff of defending against the summary judgment motion, thereby
introducing an incentive for increased expenditures. This in turn will increase
up-front expenditures (and thus deadweight losses) by plaintiffs and correspond-
ingly reduce the settlement zone prior to trial to the extent that these expendi-
tures are recoverable. As a result, this modification may reduce the prospects
for settlement where defendants move for summary judgment cost-free.162
Should the defendant decide to expend resources documenting the summary
judgment motion, there is no fee shifting, the plaintiff's marginal costs are
unchanged, and plaintiffs have no incentive for excess expenditure on summary
judgment. However, the defendant's up-front expenditures will rise, as under
the previous modification, with two consequences. First, raising up-front expen-
ditures increases expected litigation costs and reduces efficiency. Second, to
the extent that defendant's expenditures are recoverable at trial, the pretrial
settlement zone will shrink, consequently reducing the likelihood of settlement.
162. This finding is consistent with the legal and economic literature analyzing the different incentives
for settlement and trial under the British and American rules. The prevalent view is that settlement is less
likely where costs are shifted. See Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really
Cheaper?, 3 LL. & ECON. ORG. 143 (1987); Brauetigam, Owen & Panzar, An Economic Analysis of
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 17 LL. & CONTEmP. PROBs. 173 (1984); Shavell, supra note 144.
Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld claim that the British system tends "to increase the frequency of trials by
giving more weight to the parties' optimism, and to increase the frequency of trial by making them more
costly and more risky." Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 115, at 1078. But see Coursey & Stanley, supra




A third alternative is to punish the defendant who moves for summary judg-
ment cost-free and fails by sanctioning the conduct. This modification will
discourage the frivolous use of summary judgment. Defendants will be reluctant
to file cost-free given the threat of sanctions unless their probability of prevail-
ing is high. They will not want to incur costs at the summary judgment stage
unless such costs are likely to yield a return in the form of a disposal of the
case at summary judgment. This solution is different from the former in that
instead of reimbursing the plaintiff for expenses incurred in a failed summary
judgment bid, the defendant incurs a sanction aimed solely at deterring such
conduct. Because this sanction is independent of the plaintiff's expenditures,
the marginal cost of plaintiff's expenditures on summary judgment is unchanged
and plaintiffs should spend the same amount defending against summary
judgment that they would have in the absence of this modification. Thus,
sanctions avoid the incentive for plaintiff overspending produced by fee shift-
ing.
Other consequences of this modification depend on whether the defendant
selects the cost-free option (at the risk of sanctions) or expends the minimum
amount necessary to avoid sanctions should the bid for summary judgment fail.
If the defendant chooses to file for summary judgment cost-free, the prospect
of sanctions should not alter plaintiff's expenditures on defense against the
summary judgment motion or the trial expenditures of either party. Therefore,
given that the defendant files cost-free, sanctions will have no impact on
settlement rates or efficiency. If the defendant moves and prophylactically
incurs the minimum level of expenses necessary to avoid sanctions, this modifi-
cation will decrease economic efficiency by increasing the up-front expenditures
by the defendant and, to the extent that defendant's costs at summary judgment
are recoverable at trial, decreasing the settlement zone and the likelihood of
settling prior to trial. Since these drawbacks are shared with fee shifting, and
since sanctions eliminate the incentive for plaintiff overspending, the latter
appears to dominate the former in terms of desirability.
D. Deterring Frivolous Summary Judgment Motions
In seeking to find a modification of cost-free summary judgment that will
alleviate some of the identified problems with the trilogy standard, two points
must be kept in mind. First, any modification should preserve the pressing
motivation for summary adjudication: the desire to rid the dockets of socially
unjustifiable strike suits. Second, the modification should avoid diminution of
the settlement zone between the parties and the untoward consequences of such
diminution on docket pressures on the courts.
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Given the balance in favor of santions over fee shifting in the prior discus-
sion, the two main contenders for a modification of summary judgment are
evidence preclusion and sanctions. Both reduce the desirability of summary
judgment for the defendant, which will reduce usage of the procedure, thereby
mitigating, to some degree, the straightforward wealth transfer from plaintiffs
to defendants.
Both procedures weaken summary judgment as a weapon against strike suits
by reducing the desirability of summary judgment to defendants. But evidence
preclusion appears to be especially problematical in terms of potentially inter-
fering with the disposition of the case on the merits at trial. Accordingly,
evidence preclusion may discourage too broad a sweep of summary adjudica-
tion, as opposed to providing a disincentive for its frivolous use. With evidence
preclusion, a defendant faced with even a patently marginal suit may be
reluctant to file faced with the threat that even a flukish failed summary judg-
ment bid may result in severe consequences at trial. The prospect of sanctions
is unlikely to create so sweeping a disincentive as to negate the benefits of
quick disposition of frivolous litigation.
The potential impact of these modifications on settlement rates also appears
to favor sanctions over evidence preclusion. The potential negative consequenc-
es for defense at trial under evidence preclusion is likely to induce defendants
to front-load expenses which, in turn, will curtail defendant's anticipated trial
expenses and corresponding incentive to settle. Evidence preclusion also front-
loads expenses to a greater extent than sanctions, so that deadweight losses will
generally be greater under evidence preclusion if the case settles prior to trial
but after summary judgment.
In sum, the use of sanctions appears to be the most effective mechanism
to deter the frivolous use of summary judgment. However, reliance on sanctions
to perform this function requires judges to view the use of summary judgment
as a more complicated procedure rather than as a simple expedient with the
potential to clear dockets. Courts must be cognizant of the potential for strategic
misuse of summary judgment and the resultant wealth transfer to defendants,
negative effects on settlement rates, increased litigation expenses, and across-
the-board deadweight losses for society.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy fundamentally recasts the law governing
summary judgment. There can be little doubt that litigants will take notice of
the Supreme Court's implicit invitation to file Rule 56 motions as part of its
announcement of the new summary judgment structure. Certainly, lower federal
courts have received the message and have begun routinely to grant such
motions. In light of the limited burden placed upon the moving party and the
significant burden on the nonmovant of documenting each point of material fact
[Vol. 100: 73
Summary Judgment
that remains in dispute, summary judgment motions will move closer to the
center of the litigation landscape once the bar absorbs the ramifications of the
Celotex standard.1 63 This trend will accelerate should the proposed modifica-
tions to the federal rules further encourage the use of summary adjudication.
The summary judgment rules restructure the value of legal claims by reallo-
cating the costs and risks associated with litigation, each to the benefit of defen-
dants. Because of the tremendous disparity in both expenditure and risk in-
volved in the filing of a summary judgment motion, defendant-movants face
the unmistakable strategic temptation to abuse these motions. In one of the
classic introductions to the economic consequences of rules of procedure, for
example, Posner acknowledges the possibility that pretrial discovery might
engender predatory conduct in litigation: "A litigant could impose heavy costs
on an opponent, at very little cost to himself, by demanding information in an
amount and form very costly for the other party to supply."164 While this
prospect was once discounted as being "rare,"165 there is little reason to be-
lieve that such a sanguine view toward the future is warranted.
163. Greenberg v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 934 (Ist Cir. 1987) (recent
caselaw has invited greater use of Rule 56).
164. Posner, supra note 11, at 433. Dean Friedenthal makes this point post-Celotex: "If one party could,
merely by filing an unsupported motion, force an opponent to make a substantial showing, there would be
a strong incentive to make such a filing, if for no other reason than to harass the other party and raise its
costs of litigation." Friedenthal, supra note 20, at 776. See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, I.,
dissenting) (allowing movant merely to assert absence of evidence "would simply permit summary judgment
procedure to be converted into a tool for harassment").
165. Posner, supra note 11, at 433.
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APPENDIX
I. THE INCENTIVES FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
The predicted economic consequences of summary judgment under the
trilogy can be derived from formal ecomonic models. Table 1 indicates the
definitions of variables used in the analysis.
Table 1
Definition of Variables
cp plaintiff expenditures on trial with no summary judgment
cp plaintiff expenditures defending against summary judgment
cp, plaintiff expenditures on trial following summary judgment
c , defendant expenditures on trial with no summary judgment
cD defendant expenditures incurred on summary judgment
ct defendant expenditures on trial following summary judgment
P fraction of expenses on summary judgment recoverable at trial
A award amount
q(cps,cs,y) probability of plaintiff victory at summary judgment (y reflects the
intrinsic merit of the case at the summary judgment stage)
p(cp,cn,a) probability of plaintiff victory at trial (a reflects the intrinsic merit
or of the case at the trial stage')
P(C~t,C~tA
The impact of the expanded availability of summary judgment can be
explained by reference to decision tree models showing the incentives presented
1. The introduction of separate parameters, a and y, allows for the possibility that there may not be
a perfect correspondence between the strength of a plaintiff's case at summary judgment and at trial.
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to each party. Figure Al displays a simple schematic of the decisions facing
plaintiff and defendant in the absence of the summary judgment option.
Dci=o T=~ ooth=o Sonomy Jtidgooct
IS. -S) PUoff sicwy
S [-cC. -Cg
Without summary judgment, the two parties initially face the option of
settling out of court. If they fail to reach a mutually acceptable settlement then
the case continues to trial. Prior to trial both parties must decide what level of
costs (c[,,cn) to incur in presenting their case. It is natural to assume that both
parties' chances of victory depend positively on the expenses they incur:
Dp(cp,cn,a)/cp > 0, and Dp(c,,cn,a)/DcD < 0, and that there are diminishing
returns to such expenditures: DZp(cp,cn,d)/acp < 0 and D2p(cp,cn,a)/acn2 > 0.
If pretrial negotiations between the parties were to fail then both would need
to decide what level of expenses to incur. The plaintiff selects cp to maximize
her expected value,
Ep = p(cp,cn,cx)A - cp,. (Al)
The defendant selects cD to minimize
ED = p(cpc,ox)A + cn. (A2)
The optimal expenditure levels for each party are such that there is no marginal
benefit to either party from increased expenditures. In other words, neither side
will find it advantageous to depart from these levels of expenditure. This can
be expressed as a Nash equilibrium solution where Up and U13 represent the
optimal value of each party's costs, such that:
=p( -,,(X)/c, p(g ,E ,a)/Cc = 1/A (A3)
Note that (A3), together with diminishing marginal returns to expenses, implies
that both U, and q are increasing in A; parties will increase their expenditures
as the magnitude of the award increases.
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If we assume risk neutrality,2 then the minimum amount the plaintiff would
be willing to accept in lieu of going to trial is indicated by
Spmn= P(A-U) + (1-P)(-), (A4)
where P is the probability of plaintiff victory given Nash expenditures as
defined in (A3). The maximum amount the defendant would pay to avoid trial
SDm = P(A+7) + (1-P)(C), (AS)
producing a settlement range between PA - ip and PA + U. If the parties settle
at the midpoint of the settlement range then,
S = PA + (c-)/2. (A6)
As discussed in the text, a common assumption is that the probability of
settlement increases with size of the settlement range, which in this case is
simply the sum of the optimal expenditures of each party (-3+7). Given this
assumption, any factor which increases this sum (such as an increase in the
amount in controversy, A), will increase the proportion of parties that settle out
of court.
2. The impact of risk aversion could be addressed by introducing utility functions encoding both parties'
risk preferences. With this modification equations (Al) and (A2) would become:
Ep = p(cp,cD,cL)U(A-c0) + [1-p(c,(cDa)]U(-cP)
FD = p(c ,cD,a)U(-A-cq) + [1-p(cPcDca)]U(-CD),
and equations (A4) and (A5) would be altered as follows:
U(Sp) = 1U(A-Ep) + (l-P)U(-Z)





Figure A2 expands the decision tree to incorporate summary judgment.
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option (top branch), the parties are in precisely the situation illustrated in Figure
Al and we would anticipate a settlement $2 = S1 = PA + (U- )/2. Indeed, if
both parties are rational they should anticipate the failure of the defendant to
move for summary judgment and should settle for this amount at the out-
set-i.e., S, = PA + (u-U)/2.
Will the defendant move for summary judgment? To address this question
we must compare her expected loss under summary judgment to her expected
loss (S2) given no summary judgment.
Assume that the plaintiff would incur costs of cp defending against summary
judgment, and that it is in the defendant's interest to move without incurring
expenditures at this stage. Sufficient conditions for the defendant not to incur
expenditures on summary judgment are:
DED D2ED
0, and, - < 0 for all cs > 0,
,c2
CD-=O
where E = -q(cp,cs, )[PA+(c- )/2] - cs.
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Below it will be shown that
cDI = c -13cD and cp, = cI-3cp.
So,
= -q(cpcDt)[PA+(c-1cDS+17cP )/2] - CD,
and,
DED 1 -Dq(c,c,)[PA+(-Ce 
-:-)/2] + Pq(c,c ,^I) 1.( )
- + -. (A7)
acfiaf 2
(A7) will be 0 if -q(cp,ci ,y)/Dcs is sufficiently small, since P3q(cp,cs,,y)/2 < 1,
always. By differentiating again with respect to cs, it is shown that the second
order condition, aEaD/C _0, is also always satisfied.
If the defendant files for summary judgment cost free (as we assume) there
are two possible outcomes. First, the defendant can prevail, in which case the
plaintiff will lose cps and the defendant will lose nothing. Alternatively, the
summary judgment bid can fail, in which case the two parties have another
chance to negotiate a settlement before proceeding to trial. If the case does go
to trial, the plaintiff will already have spent cp, on legal expenses, Pcp of which
is recoverable at trial. The probability of plaintiff success depends on plaintiff
expenses at trial plus plaintiff expenses at summary judgment that are recover-
able at trial, c, + Pcp. This sum can be labeled the plaintiff's "effective" expen-
diture at trial. Since all expenditures that are not recoverable are sunk and
irrelevant for future decision making, the optimal level of effective plaintiff
expenditures is such that 0f, + u = C; effective plaintiff expenditures will
equal trial expenditures in the no-summary judgment situation. The same is true
for defendant expenditures-uis + U = qn, but, since c=O, by assumption,
Ut=-. Thus, P(+7I,,a) = P(cUa. However, S3, the point at which the
parties will settle if they settle after an unsuccessful summary judgment bid but
before trial, is not identical to S2. The reason is that the plaintiff has already
spent Ups defending herself against summary judgment and thus the marginal
cost for the plaintiff of going to trial after summary judgment is lower than if
trial does not follow summary judgment. This lowers the plaintiff's incentive
to settle, and her minimum settlement point is raised from PA-U to PA-J
which equals PA-z+3C. The defendant's maximum settlement point remains
unchanged from the top branch.3 If we assume, again, that the parties settle
3. The situation will be different if a failed bid at summary judgment causes one or both sides to revise
their estimate of the plaintiff's likelihood of success at trial. If both sides revised their expectations the effect
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at the midpoint of the settlement range, then S3 = PA +(--zp+3g)/2. Although
the settlement results in a greater payment to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has
already incurred costs of U at this point so that her actual gain is S3-UP which
is smaller by a factor of up(1-03/2) than the plaintiff's gain with no summary
judgment option. When P is zero-when plaintiff expenses on summary
judgment are entirely nonrecoverable at trial-then the plaintiff loses the entire
amount expended on summary judgmept with no redeeming offset. On the other
hand, when 03 equals 1-when plaintiff expenses on summary judgment are
entirely recoverable at trial-then, in effect, the cost of defending against
summary judgment is split equally between the parties.
The consequences of the additional cost to each party from a failed summa-
ry judgment motion are of critical importance. As a result of the reduction in
plaintiff trial cost, the settlement zone following a failed summary judgment
motion is narrower--n+gj,-f3gs-than the range of ug+-p that existed prior to
the filing of the summary judgment motion. Thus, if the probability of settle-
ment is positively related to the settlement range, the probability of settlement
without trial is less likely following an unsuccessful summary judgment bid
than in the absence of such a bid.
Finally, to calculate the overall expected values of the suit to both parties,
the prospect of additional payment to plaintiff and additional cost to defendant
following a defeated motion for summary judgment must be downweighted by
the probability, q(cp,0,y), that the defendant prevails on summary judgment. In
other words, the increased settlement value of a claim after a denial of summary
judgment must be offset by the likelihood of a grant of summary judgment. To
calculate the expected value of plaintiff's claim in light of the altered summary
judgment standard, let Q = q(g ,O,y) be the probability of plaintiff victory on
summary judgment given the expected value maximizing value of U.L The
plaintiff's expected value is
Ep = Q[PA+(C-Up+Pfp)/2]-U, (A8)
and the defendant's expected cost is
ED = -Q[PA+(UD- -+-)/2]. (A9)
would be to increase the value of p(c',c1,a).
4. Q is calculated by selecting U to maximize the expected value to the plaintiff.
Since r = rp - Pup, Ep = q(z,,O,y)[PA +(u-f+3cP)/2]-U;.
The plaintiff will select the value of to maximize the expected value to the plaintiff-i.e.,
DFMcp = Dq(c;,0,,y)/Dcp[PA + (cD-U+P; )/21 + Pq(cO,a)2 -1 = 0
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
The defendant will file for summary judgment if her expected loss under
summary judgment is less than her expected loss without summary judgment,
i.e., if (A9)-(A6) > 0, or
[1-0] [PA +(c-,)/21 > Q0UY2. (AlO)
This equation identifies the determinants that will lead a defendant to move
for summary judgment. For given levels of plaintiff and defendant costs, the
defendant's decision to move for summary judgment will be positively related
to the award amount A and the intrinsic merit of the case at the trial stage a,
and negatively related to the intrinsic merit of the case at the summary judg-
ment stage y, negatively related to the amount that the plaintiff spends on
summary judgment, and negatively related to -- the degree to which plaintiff
expenses on summary judgment are recoverable at trial. In addition, for given
probabilities of prevailing on summary judgment and at trial, the defendant is
more likely to move for summary judgment as the defendant's expected trial
costs increase and as plaintiff's anticipated trial costs decrease.5
If it is in the defendant's interest to move for summary judgment, then the
parties should settle from the outset at the midpoint of (A8) and (A9)-i.e., at
s [ = PA +(c+Up3OU+s)/2] - UjW2, (All)
which is equal to
Q[PA +(-D-Up)/2] - (1-Qp)- /2. (A12)
Comparing A12 to A6, it is evident that the anticipated settlement value is
unambiguously lower given summary judgment than without summary judg-
ment. Summary judgment, therefore, always lowers the settlement obtained by
the plaintiff if it is in the defendant's interest to file.
5. Higher defendant trial costs increase the defendant's likelihood of moving because they create a
disincentive for going to trial. Increasing plaintiff trial costs decreases the likelihood of summary judgment
because it has the effect of increasing the defendant's expected gain from trial, decreasing the incentive
for summary judgment.
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